;-NRLF 


HE  §F 

JULY,    (361. 

FiY 

GUST AVUS  W.   SMITH, 


Form<wiy  Major- Goaw 


GENERALS 


J,  E,  JOHNSTON  AND  G,  T,  BEAUREGARD 


AT 


THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS, 


7    1861. 


BY 

GTJSTAVUS  w.  SMITH, 

\> 

FORMERLY  MAJOR-GENERAL  CONFEDERATE  STATES  ARMY. 


NEW    YORK  : 

G.  CRAWFORD,  PRINTER  AND  STATIONER, 
Nos.  49  AND  51  PARK  PLACE. 

1892. 


•IS 


COPYRIGHT,  1892,  BT  GUSTAVTJS  W.  SMITH. 


CONTENTS. 


PAGE 


Preliminary 5 

PART  I. 

The  Official  Records. 

Johnston's  Army  of  the  Shenandoah  and   Beauregard's 

Army  of  the  Potomac. 7 

Correspondence  between  the  two  army  commanders,  June 

and  July,  1861 8 

General  Johnston  arrives  at  Manassas  Junction 9 

Order  for  battle 10 

President  Davis  defines   "  relative  positions  "  of  Generals 

Johnston  and  Beauregard 11 

Extracts  from  General  Johnston's  official  report 11 

Extracts  from  General  Beauregard's  official  report 15 

Comments  on  the  tenor  of  these  two  official  reports  in  re 
gard  to  the  active  command  of  General  Beauregard.         21 
Extracts  from  the  official  report  of  General  D.  R.  Jones. .          22 
Effect  of  the  miscarriage  of  Beauregard's  order  to  Ewell 

to  attack 23 

President  Davis  promotes  Beauregard  to  the  rank  of  full 

General 23 

General  E.  E.  Lee  and  the  Secretary  of  War  congratulate 

Beauregard 24 

Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard  jointly  issue  a  con 
gratulatory  address  to  their  combined  forces ...  24 

Each  of  these  two  ranking  Confederate  officers  acquired 

great  distinction . .          25 

General  Johnston,  in  his  "  Narrative,"  1874,  and  in  the 
Century  Magazine,  May,  1885,  claimed  more  credit 
than  was  justly  his  due,  and  attacked  the  correctness 
of  General  Beauregard's  official  report 26 


M232067 


IV  CONTENTS. 


PAET  II. 
General  Johnstons  Claims  Considered. 

PAGE 

1.  He  would  now  have  it  believed  he  "  played  with  Pat 

terson,  reinforced  Beauregard,  and  won  a  victory  " . .          27 

2.  He  now  claims  that  he  sketched  a  simple  order  of  march 

on  the  20th,  which  he  begged  General  Beauregard  to 
have  prepared  and  submitted  to  him  for  inspection  so 
that  the  order  could  be  distributed  to  the  troops  be 
fore  night 28 

3.  He   now   claims   that   Beauregard's   second  plan   was 

"frustrated,''  a  perhaps  fortunately,"  by  the  appear 
ance  of  strong  bodies  of  United  States  troops  on  the 
wooded  heights  in  front  of  Mitchell's,  Blackburn's  and 
McLean's  Fords 30 

4.  General  Johnston   says:  "I   had   been   waiting   with 

General  Beauregard  on  Lookout  Hill  for  evidence  of 
General  McDowell's  design 34 

5.  In  his  "  After-thoughts,''  General  Johnston  would  have 

it  believed  that  it  "  was  a  great  fault,"  on  his  part, 
that  a  large  portion  of  Beauregard's  troops  were  u  not 
engaged  in  the  battle  " 39 

6.  He  now  says  :  "  While  we  were  riding  forward  General 

Beauregard  suggested  to  me  to  assign  him  to  the 
immediate  command  of  the  troops  engaged  " 40 

7.  General  Johnston  claims :  "  As  fought,  the  battle  was 

made  by  me,"  and  adds  :  "  Beauregard  commanded 
those  troops  [on  the  Confederate  left]  under  me ;  as 
elsewhere,  Lieutenant- Generals  commanded  corps, 
and  Major-Generals  divisions,  under  me '' 42 

8.  General  Johnston  claims  that :  "  There  could  have  been 

no  greater  mistake  on  General  Ewell's  part  than  mak 
ing  the  movement  to  Centreville  " 44 

Conclusion 45 

APPENDIX.     Copy  of  the  order  for  battle , 

MAP  of  the  battlefield  and  vicinitv . .  End 


PRELIMINARY. 


In  the  latter  part  of  September,  1861,  at  the  joint  request 
of  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard,  I  was  appointed  Major- 
General  by  President  Davis,  and  ordered  to  report  to  General 
Johnston  for  duty  as  commander  of  the  Second  Corps  of  his 
army,  then  at  and  in  the  vicinity  of  Fairfax  Court-house,  Ya. 
The  First  Corps  was  commanded  by  General  Beauregard.  In 
timate  personal  and  official  relations  existed  between  the  three 
of  us.* 

After  it  was  decided  by  President  Davis,  in  the  first  days  of 
October,  that  General  Johnston's  army  could  not  be  reinforced  to 
an  extent  sufficient  to  justify  an  immediate  campaign  of  invasion, 
the  forces  were  withdrawn  to  the  neighborhood  of  Centreville. 
During  the  next  few  months  we  had  abundant  leisure,  and,  in 
that  time,  I  became  thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  principal 
events  connected  with  the  battle  of  Manassas  and  familiar  with 
the  ground  upon  which  the  fighting  occurred.  The  impressions 
I  then  received  were  deep  and  lasting.  They  were  derived  from 
all  available  sources,  principally  from  Generals  Johnston  and 
Beauregard. 

*  After  the  battle  of  Manassas,  the  combined  forces  of  Generals  Johnston 
and  Beauregard  were  called  the  "  Army  of  the  Potomac"  ;  which  had  been 
the  designation  of  Beauregard's  forces  before  the  two  bodies  of  troops  were 
united.  Those  of  the  latter  were  now  designated  the  First  Corps,  and  John 
ston's  troops,  from  the  Shenandoah,  the  Second  Corps.  Up  to  the  time  of  my 
arrival  General  Johnston  had  commanded  this  corps,  which  consisted  of  eight 
brigades,  not  organized  into  divisions,  and  he,  at  the  same  time,  commanded 
the  army.  I  relieved  General  Johnston  from  duty  as  a  Corps  Commander,  and 
he  was  thus  enabled  to  give  his  undivided  attention  to  the  control  of  the  army 
as  a  whole. 


0  PRELIMINARY. 

In  1874  I  read  General  Johnston's  "  Narrative,"  and  was 
surprised  and  shocked  to  find  that,  in  reference  to  Manassas,  his 
account  differed  so  greatly  from  the  opinions  I  had  formed 
in  1861,  which  were  derived  in  great  part  from  himself,  and 
from  reading  his  official  report. 

In  his  "  Narrative,"  he  not  only  claimed  more  credit  for  his 
services  in  that  battle  than  I  had  been  led  to  believe  lie  was 
justly  entitled  to  receive,  but,  in  my  opinion,  he  now  unfairly 
called  in  question  the  accuracy  of  General  Beauregard's  official 
report,  and  endeavored  to  detract  from  the  well-earned  distinc 
tion  of  that  army  commander. 

In  the  Century  Magazine,  May,  1885,  General  Johnston  em 
phasized  his  attack  on  the  correctness  of  General  Beauregard's 
official  report,  and  enlarged  his  own  claims. 

Since  that  time  the  official  records  have  become  accessible.  I 
have  made  a  synopsis  of  those  records,  and  propose  to  contrast 
some  of  General  Johnston's  more  recent  statements  with  his  own 
official  report,  and  with  facts  which  were  well  established  in 
1861. 


GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 


AT  THE 


BATTLE   OF   MANASSAS. 


PART  I. 
The  Official  Records. 

Early  in  the  summer  of  1861,  General  J.  E.  Johnston  com 
manded  the  Confederate  Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  which  pro 
tected  that  valley  against  the  Federal  forces  under  General 
Patterson ;  whilst  General  G.  T.  Beaureguard  commanded  the 
Confederate  Army  of  the  Potomac,  near  Manassas,  confronting 
the  main  Federal  Army,  which  was  in  the  vicinity  of  "Washing 
ton  City. 

These  two  Confederate  leaders  controlled  separate  armies; 
and,  each  independently  of  the  other,  reported  to,  and  received 
orders  direct  from  the  War  Department  at  Richmond. 

On  the  llth  of  June,  1861,  General  Beaureguard,  from 
Manassas,  wrote  to  President  Davis  :  "  I  wish  it  distinctly  under 
stood,  however,  that  if  the  army  should  offer  battle  on  the  line  of 
Bull  Run,  I  shall  accept  it  for  my  command,  against  whatever 
odds  he  may  array  in  my  front."  Again,  on  the  next  day,  he 
wrote  :  "  The  enemy  seem  to  be  taking  the  offensive  towards 
Harper's  Ferry,  and  a  few  days  hence  may  find  General  J.  E. 
Johnston  in  such  a  critical  condition  as  to  render  it  impossible  to 
relieve  him.  If  he  were  ordered  to  abandon  forthwith  his  pres 
ent  position  and  concentrate  suddenly  his  forces  with  mine, 
guarding  with  small  detachments  all  the  passes  through  which 
the  enemy  might  follow  him,  we  could,  by  a  bold  and  rapid 
movement  forward,  retake  Arlington  Heights  and  Alexandria, 


8 


GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 


if  not  too  strongly  fortified  and  garrisoned,  which  would  have 
the  effect  of  recalling  all  the  enemy's  forces  from  Northern  Vir 
ginia  for  the  protection  of  Washington.  I  beg  and  entreat  that 
a  concerted  plan  of  operations  be  adopted  at  once  by  the  Gov 
ernment  for  its  different  columns.  Otherwise  we  will  be  assailed 
in  detail  by  superior  forces  and  will  be  cut  off  or  destroyed 
entirely." 

From  Winchester,  on  the  21st  of  that  month,  Major  W.  H.  C. 
Whiting,  General  Johnston's  Chief  of  Staff,  wrote  to  General 
Beaureguard  :  "  In  the  event  of  a  move  upon  you,  having  now 
cleared  the  enemy  from  this  part  of  the  valley,  the  General 
might  be  able  to  throw  from  5,000  to  6,000  men  on  his  flank." 
Later,  on  the  same  day,  General  Johnston  wrote  to  General 
Beauregard  :  "  In  the  absence  of  a  common  superior,  I  am  anx 
ious  to  correspond  with  you— to  be  informed  of  your  needs— 
that  I  may  help  you  when  the  state  of  things  in  my  front  will 
permit  me  to  do  so." 

On  the  next  day  General  Beaureguard  wrote  to  General 
Johnston :  "  I  consider  the  chain  of  Bull  Eun  Mountain,  Little 
River,  and  Goose  Creek  a  strong  secondary  line  of  defense  for 
my  left  flank,  but  should  they  penetrate  into  Virginia,  this  side 
of  it,  by  moving  rapidly  a  strong  force  of  your  command  to 
Aldie  or  Leesburg  to  take  them  in  flank  or  rear,  they  would 
have  to  fall  back  on  the  Potomac,  or  run  the  risk  of  being  cut  off 
from  their  base  of  operations,  particularly  if  I  could  attack  them 
from  here  at  the  same  time."  Two  days  later :  "  I  do  not  believe 
in  the  hostile  advance  of  General  Patterson,  for  I  am  informed, 
on  what  I  consider  good  authority,  that  they  have  quite  a  stampede 
in  Washington,  thinking  that  we  are  going  to  unite  our  forces 
for  its  attack,  or  that  you  are  going  to  cross  the  Potomac  at  or 
about  Edward's  Ferry  to  attack  it  in  rear,  whilst  I  attack  it  in 
front." 

On  the  9th  of  July,  General  Johnston  wrote  to  General 
Beauregard  :  "  I  wrote  you  yesterday  that  intelligence  I  have  just 
received  indicated  that  the  enemy's  intention  is  to  advance  upon 
us  here.  Colonel  Stuart,  who  is  at  the  head  of  our  scouting 
service,  has  just  written  to  me,  that  he  suspects,  for  certain  cir 
cumstances,  that  he  will  move  forward  te-night.  We  are  just 


AT   THE   BATTLE    OF   MANASSAS.  9 

beginning  some  little  field  works,  .  .  .  but  have  done  too  little 
to  make  them  available.  .  .  .  Militia,  about  2,000,  were  called 
out,  but  they  have  to  prepare  their  own  ammunition,  which  they 
have  not  done.  So  the  chances  are  against  us.  Less  so,  however, 
than  a  retreat  would  make  them." 

The  official  records  show  that  in  the  meantime  General 
Beauregard  more  than  once  warned  the  Confederate  Government, 
and  General  Johnston,  that  a  forward  movement  of  the  main 
Federal  Army  from  the  vicinity  of  Washington  was  imminent. 
He  urged  the  importance  of  transferring  General  Johnston's 
army  from  Winchester  to  the  vicinity  of  Manassas,  and  again 
informed  the  Government  that  whether  he  received  aid  from 
General  Johnston's  forces  or  not,  he  had  determined  to  hold  the 
defensive  line  of  Bull  Eun ;  and,  when  the  Federals  closely  ap 
proached  that  position  he  would  assume  the  offensive,  cross  that 
stream,  and  attack  them. 

On  the  17th  of  July  he  telegraphed  to  the  Government,  and 
to  General  Johnston,  that  McDowell  was  advancing  with  his 
whole  army,  and  had  driven  the  Confederate  outposts  from  Fair 
fax  Court-house.  The  War  Department  at  Eichmond  ordered 
General  Johnston  to  move  his  army  from  Winchester  to  Manassas. 
That  order  was  received  about  1  A.  M.  on  the  18th,  and  General 
Johnston  telegraphed  to  the  Government :  "I  have  had  the  honor 
to  receive  your  telegram  of  yesterday.  General  Patterson  seems 
to  have  moved  yesterday  to  Charlestown,  twenty-three  miles  to 
the  east  of  Winchester.  Unless  he  prevents  it,  we  shall  move 
towards  General  Beauregard  to-day." 

On  that  day  (the  18th)  the  Federals  attacked  Beauregard's 
line  at  Blackburn's  Ford.  That  attack  was  repulsed,  but  Beaure 
gard  then  refrained  from  making  a  counter-attack,  by  crossing 
Bull  Eun,  because  he  preferred  to  await  the  arrival  of  Johnston's 
forces,  which  he  knew  had  been,  on  the  previous  day,  ordered  to 
move  to  Manassas. 

On  the  19th,  a  small  portion  of  Johnston's  army  reached 
Beauregard.  About  noon  on  the  20th,  General  Johnston  him 
self  arrived  with  another  detachment,  and  he  was  then  confident 
the  whole  of  his  forces  would  unite  with  those  of  Beauregard 
before  daylight  next  morning. 


10  GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 

During  the  night,  by  authority  of  General  Johnston,  General 
Beauregard  drew  up  and  signed  an  order  for  battle,  directing  the 
movements  of  all  of  Johnston's  forces  as  well  as  his  own. 

That  order  was  formally  approved,  in  writing,  by  General 
Johnston  at  4:.CO  A.  M.  on  the  21st.  It  required  that : 

I. — EwelPs  brigade,  supported  by  Holmes'  brigade,  should 
commence  the  offensive  movement  by  crossing  Bull  Run  at 
Union  Mills,  and  move  on  the  Centreville  road  to  attack  the 
enemy. 

II. — Jones'  brigade,  supported  by  Early 's  brigade,  was  to 
cross  at  McLean's  Ford,  and  attack  on  Ewell's  left, 

III. — Longstreet's  brigade,  supported  by  Jackson's  brigade, 
was  to  cross  at  McLean's  Ford  and  go  into  action  on  Jones'  left. 

IV. — Bonham's  Brigade,  supported  by  Bartow's  brigade, 
was  to  cross  at  Mitchell's  Ford,  and  go  into  action  on  Long- 
street's  left. 

Y. — Cocke's  brigade,  supported  by  Elzey's  brigade,  was  to 
cross  at  the  Stone  Bridge,  and  the  fords  on  the  right  thereof,  to 
the  left  of  Bonham's  brigade,  and  move  to  the  attack  in  the 
direction  of  Centreville. 

YI. — Bee's  brigade,  Wilcox's  brigade,  Stuart's  cavalry,  and 
Walton's  battery,  would  constitute  the  reserve  and  was  to  cross 
at  Mitchell's  Ford,  to  be  used  as  circumstances  might  require.* 

At  5.30  A.  M.  on  the  21st,  it  was  reported  that  the  Federals, 
in  large  force,  were  threatening  close  in  front  of  Stone  Bridge. 
Beauregard's  plan,  as  given  above,  was  at  once  modified,  with  the 
approval  of  General  Johnston,  so  that  the  Confederate  left  would 
stand  on  the  defensive,  and  only  the  right  and  centre  would  cross 
the  stream — assume  the  active  offensive — and  immediately  attack 
the  left  flank  and  rear  of  the  Federals  between  Bull  Bun  and 
Centreville.  This  was  Beauregard's  second  plan. 

En  route  from  Winchester  to  Manassas,  General  Johnston 
made  an  inquiry  in  regard  to  the  "  relative  positions  "  of  himself 
and  General  Beauregard.  In  reply  President  Davis  telegraphed 
him : 

*  For  the  full  text  of  this  order  see  Appendix  A. 


AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  11 

"  You  are  a  General  in  the  Confederate  Army,  possessed  of 
the  power  attaching  to  that  rank.  You  will  know  how  to  make 
the  exact  knowledge  of  Brigadier-General  Beauregard,  as  well  of 
the  ground  as  of  the  troops  and  preparation,  avail  for  the  success 
of  the  object  in  which  you  co-operate.  The  zeal  of  both  assures 
me  of  harmonious  action." 


EXTRACTS  FROM  GENERAL  J.  E.  JOHNSTON'S  OFFICIAL  REPORT.* 

"  .  .  .  I  reached  Manassas  about  noon  on  the  20th. 
I  found  General  Beauregard's  position  too  exten 
sive,  and  the  ground  too  densely  wooded  and  intricate,  to  be 
learned  in  the  brief  time  at  my  disposal,  and  therefore  deter 
mined  to  rely  upon  his  knowledge  of  it  and  of  the  enemy's  posi 
tions.  This  I  did  readily  from  full  confidence  in  his  capacity. 
.  .  .  I  regarded  the  arrival  of  the  remainder  of  the  Army  of 
the  Shenandoah  during  the  night  as  certain,  and  Patterson's 
junction  with  the  Grand  [Union]  Army  on  the  22d  as  probable. 
During  the  evening  it  was  determined,  instead  of  remaining  in 
the  defensive  positions  then  occupied,  to  assume  the  offensive  and 
attack  the  enemy  before  such  a  junction.  General  Beauregard 
proposed  a  plan  of  battle,  which  I  approved  without  hesitation. 
He  drew  up  the  necessary  order  during  the  night,  which  was 
approved  formally  by  me  at  4.30  o'clock  on  the  morning  of  the 
21st.  The  early  movements  of  the  enemy  on  that  morning  and 
the  non-arrival  of  the  expected  troops  prevented  its  execution. 
General  Beauregard  afterwards  proposed  a  modification  of  the 
abandoned  plan,  to  attack  with  our  right  while  the  left  stood  on 
the  defensive.  This,  too,  became  impracticable,  and  a  battle  en 
sued  different  in  place  and  circumstances  from  any  previous  plan 
on  our  side.  .  .  .  About  8  o'clock  General  Beauregard  and  1 
placed  ourselves  on  a  commanding  hill  in  rear  of  General  Bon- 
ham's  left.  Near  9  o'clock  the  signal  officer,  Captain  Alexander, 
reported  that  a  large  body  of  troops  was  crossing  the  valley  of 
Bull  Run  some  two  miles  above  the  [stone]  bridge.  General 
Bee,  who  had  been  placed  near  Colonel  Cocke's  position,  Colonel 

*  "  Official  Records/'  Series  I.,  Vol.  II.,  p.  470. 


GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 

Hampton,  with  his  legion,  and  Colonel  Jackson,  from  a  point 
near  General  Bonham's  left,  were  ordered  to  hasten  to  the  left 
flank.  .  .  .  The  enemy,  under  cover  of  a  strong  demonstra 
tion  on  our  right,  made  a  long  detour  through  the  woods  on  his 
right,  crossed  Bull  Eun  two  miles  above  our  left,  and  threw  him 
self  upon  the  flank  and  rear  of  our  position.  This  movement 
was  fortunately  discovered  by  us  in  time  to  check  its  progress, 
and  ultimately  to  form  a  new  line  of  battle  nearly  at  right  angles 
with  the  defensive  line  of  Bull  Run." 

General  Johnston  then  describes,  in  some  detail,  the  move 
ment  of  Colonel  Evans,  supported  by  General  Bee,  and  later  by 
Colonel  Hampton,  to  check  the  enemy,  advancing  on  the  Sudley 
road  ;  and  the  withdrawal  of  these  forces— after  a  bloody  contest 
—to  the  plateau  where  the  main  fighting  occurred  later  ;  and  on 
which  Colonel  Jackson's  brigade  had  just  formed  in  line  of 
battle. 

General  Johnston  adds :  "  In  the  meantime  I  waited  with 
General  Beauregard  near  the  centre  the  full  development  of  the 
enemy's  designs.  About  11  o'clock  the  violence  of  the  firing  on 
the  left  indicated  a  battle,  and  the  march  of  a  large  body  of 
troops  from  the  enemy's  centre  towards  the  conflict  was 
shown  by  clouds  of  dust.  I  was  thus  convinced  that  his 
great  effort  was  to  be  made  with  his  right.  I  stated  that 
conviction  to  General  Beauregard,  and  the  absolute 
necessity  of  immediately  strengthening  our  left  as 
much  as  possible.  Orders  were  accordingly  sent  to  General 
Holmes  and  Colonel  Early  to  move  with  all  speed  to  the  sound 
of  the  firing,  and  to  General  Bonham  to  send  up  two  of  his  regi 
ments  and  a  battery.  General  Beauregard  and  I  then  hurried  at 
a  rapid  gallop  to  the  scene  of  action,  about  four  miles  off.  On 
the  way  I  directed  my  chief  of  artillery,  Colonel  Pendleton,  to 
follow  with  his  own  and  Alburtis'  batteries.  We  came  not  a  mo 
ment  too  soon.  The  long  contest  against  five-fold  odds  and  heavy 
losses,  especially  of  field  officers,  had  greatly  discouraged  the 
troops  of  General  Bee  and  Colonel  Evans.  Our  presence  with 
them  under  fire,  and  some  example,  had  the  happiest  effect  on 
the  spirit  of  the  troops.  Order  was  soon  restored  and  the  battle 
re-established,  to  which  the  firmness  of  Jackson's  brigade  greatly 


AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANA8SAS.  13 

contributed.  Then,  in  a  brief  and  rapid  conference,  General 
Beauregard  was  assigned  to  tlie  command  of  the  left,  which, 
as  the  younger  officer,  he  claimed,  while  I  returned  to  that 
of  the  whole  field.  .  .  . 

"  My  headquarters  were  now  established  near  the  Lewis  house. 
From  this  commanding  elevation  my  view  embraced  the  position 
of  the  enemy  beyond  the  stream  and  the  approaches  to  the  Stone 
Bridge,  a  point  of  special  importance.  I  could  also  see  the  ad 
vance  of  our  troops  far  down  the  valley  in  the  direction  of  Ma- 
nassas  and  observe  the  progress  of  the  action  and  the  manoeuvres 
of  the  enemy." 

Speaking  of  the  main  fighting  on  the  plateau,  General  John, 
ston  says  :  "  For  nearly  three  hours  they  [the  Confederate  forces] 
maintained  their  position,  repelling  five  successive  assaults  by 
the  heavy  masses  of  the  enemy,  whose  numbers  enabled  him  con 
tinually  to  bring  up  fresh  troops  as  their  preceding  columns  were 
driven  back.  Colonel  Stuart  contributed  to  one  of  these  repulses 
by  a  well-timed  and  vigorous  charge  on  the  enemy's  right  flank  with 
two  companies  of  his  cavalry.  .  .  .  The  expected  reinforce 
ments  appeared  soon  after.  Colonel  Cocke  was  then  desired  to  lead 
his  brigade  into  action  to  support  the  right  of  the  troops  engaged, 
which  he  did  with  alacrity  and  effect.  Within  a  half  hour  the 
two  regiments  of  General  Bonham's  brigade  (Cash's  and  Iver- 
shaw's)  came  up,  and  were  directed  against  the-  enemy's  right, 
which  he  seemed  to  be  strenghtening.  Fisher's  North  Carolina 
regiment  was  soon  after  sent  in  the  same  direction.  About  3 
o'clock,  while  the  enemy  seemed  to  be  striving  to  outflank  and 
drive  back  our  left,  and  thus  separate  us  from  Manassas,  General 
E.  K.  Smith  arrived  with  three  regiments  of  Elzey's  brigade.  He 
was  instructed  to  attack  the  right  flank  of  the  enemy,  now  ex 
posed  to  us.  Before  the  movement  was  completed  he  fell,  se 
verely  wounded.  Colonel  Elzey,  at  once  taking  command,  exe 
cuted  it  with  great  promptitude  and  vigor.  General  Beauregard 
rapidly  seized  the  opportunity  thus  afforded  him,  and  threw  for 
ward  his  whole  line.  The  enemy  was  driven  back  from 
the  long-contested  hill,  and  victory  was  no  longer 
doubtful.  He  made  yet  another  attempt  to  retrieve 
the  day.  He  again  extended  his  right  with  a  still 


4  GENERALS   JOHNSTON   AND   BEAUREGAKD 

wider  sweep  to  turn  our  left.  Just  as  he  reformed  to  renew  the 
battle  Colonel  Early's  three  regiments  came  upon  the  field.  The 
enemy's  new  formation  exposed  his  right  flank  more  even  than 
the  previous  one.  Colonel  Early  was  therefore  ordered  to  throw 
himself  directly  upon  it,  supported  by  Colonel  Stuart's  cavalry 
and  Beckham's  battery.  He  executed  this  attack  bravely  and 
well,  while  a  simultaneous  charge  was  made  by  General  Beaure- 
gard  in  front.  The  enemy  was  broken  by  this  combined  attack. 
He  lost  all  the  artillery  which  he  had  advanced  to  the  scene  of 
the  conflict.  He  had  no  more  fresh  troops  to  rally  on,  and  a 
general  rout  ensued.  Instructions  were  instantly  sent  to  General 
Bonham  to  inarch  by  the  quickest  route  to  the  turnpike  to  inter 
cept  the  fugitives,  and  to  General  Longstreet  to  follow  as  closely 
as  possible  upon  the  right.  Their  progress  was  checked  by  the 
enemy's  reserve  and  by  night  at  Centreville.  .  .  .  Colonel 
Stuart  pressed  the  pursuit  on  the  principal  line  of  retreat,  the 
Sudley  road.  Four  companies  of  cavalry,  under  Colonel  Radford 
and  Lieutenant-Colonel  Munford,  which  I  had  held  in  reserve, 
were  ordered  to  cross  the  stream  at  Bali's  Ford  to  reach  the  turn 
pike,  the  line  of  retreat  of  the  enemy's  left.  ...  A  report 
came  to  me  from  the  right  that  a  strong  body  of  U.  S.  troops 
was  advancing  upon  Manassas.  General  Holmes,  who  had  just 
reached  the  field,  and  General  Ewell,  on  his  way  to  it,  were 
ordered  to  meet  this  unexpected  attack.  They  found  no  foe, 
however.  .  .  . 

"  Our  victory  was  as  complete  as  one  gained  by  infantry  and 
artillery  can  be.  An  adequate  force  of  calvary  would  have  made  it 
decisive.  .  .  .  The  loss  of  the  Army  of  the  Potomac  [Beaure- 
gard's]  was  108  killed,  510  wounded,  and  12  missing.  That  of 
the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah  [Johnston's]  was  270  killed,  979 
wounded,  and  18  missing.  Total  killed,  378 ;  wounded,  1,489  ; 
missing,  30.  ...  It  will  be  remarked  that  the  three 
brigadier-generals  of  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah  were  all 
wounded  [General  Bee,  mortally].  .  .  . 

"  The  apparent  firmness  of  the  U.  S.  troops  at  Centreville, 
who  had  not  been  engaged,  which  checked  our  pursuit;  the 
strong  forces  occupying  the  works  near  Georgetown,  Arlington, 
and  Alexandria ;  the  certainty,  too,  that  General  Patterson,  if 


AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  15 

needed,  would  reach  Washington  with  his  army  of  thirty  thou 
sand  men  sooner  than  we  could,  and  the  condition  and  inadequate 
means  of  the  army  in  ammunition,  provisions,  and  transporta 
tion  prevented  any  serious  thoughts  of  advancing  against  the 
capital.  It  is  certain  that  the  fresh  troops  within  the  works  were 
in  number  quite  sufficient  for  their  defense.  If  not,  General 
Patterson's  Army  would  certainly  reinforce  them  soon  enough." 
From  General  Johnson's  report  it  might  be  inferred  that  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  waited  until  11  A.  M.,  "  the  full  development  of 
the  enemy's  designs  "  ;  and  that,  at  the  end  of  that  time,  General 
Johnston  gave  specific  instructions,  telling  General  Beauregard 
what  to  do  ;  and  when,  and  how,  to  do  it.  But  General  John 
ston  does  not  exactly  say  this.  "What  he  does  say  will  be  better 
understood  in  view  of  the  specific  statements  contained  in  the 
following : 

EXTRACTS    FROM    GENERAL    BEAUREGARD' 8    OFFICIAL  REPORT. 

"  .  .  .  .  The  War  Department  having  been  informed 
by  me,  by  telegraph,  on  the  17th  of  July,  of  the  movement  of 
General  McDowell,  General  Johnston  was  immediately  ordered 
to  form  a  junction  of  his  army  corps  with  mine.  .  .  .  Gen 
eral  Holmes  was  also  directed  to  push  forward.  .  .  .  General 
Johnston  arrived  here  about  noon  on  the  20th  of  July,  and  being 
my  senior  in  rank,  he  necessarily  assumed  command  of  all  the 
forces  of  the  Confederate  States  then  concentrating  at  this  point. 
Made  acquainted  with  my  plan  of  operation  and  dispositions  to 
meet  the  enemy,  he  gave  them  his  entire  approval,  and  generously 
directed  their  execution  under  my  command.  .  .  . 

"  It  became  necessary,  on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  before 
daylight,  to  modify  the  plan  accepted,  to  suit  the  contingency  of 
an  immediate  attack  on  our  lines  by  the  main  force  of  the  enemy, 
then  plainly  at  hand.  .  .  .  By  half-past  four  A.  M.,  on  the 
21st  of  July,  I  had  prepared  and  dispatched  orders*  directing 
the  whole  of  the  Confederate  forces  within  the  lines  of  Bull  Eun, 
including  the  brigades  and  regiments  of  General  Johnston  which 
had  arrived  at  that  time,  to  be  held  in  readiness  to  inarch  at  a 

*  See  Appendix  A. 


16  GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 

moment's  notice.  .  .  .  Informed  at  5.30  A.  M.,  by  Colonel 
Evans,  that  the  enemy  had  deployed  some  twelve  hundred  men 
with  several  pieces  of  artillery  in  his  immediate  front  [at  and 
above  the  Stone  Bridge,  the  left  of  the  Confederate  line],  I  at 
once  ordered  him,  as  also  General  Cocke,  if  attacked,  to  maintain 
their  position  to  the  last  extremity.  In  my  opinion,  the  most 
effective  method  of  relieving  that  flank  was  by  a  rapid,  determined 
attack,  with  my  right  wing  and  centre,  on  the  enemy's  flank  and 
rear  at  Centerville.  ...  By  such  a  movement  I  confidently 
expected  to  achieve  a  complete  victory  for  my  country  by  12 
meridian.  These  new  dispositions  were  submitted  to  General 
Johnston,  who  fully  approved  them,  and  the  orders  for  their  im 
mediate  execution  were  at  once  issued.  Brigadier-General  Ewell 
was  directed  to  begin  the  movement,  to  be  followed  and  supported 
successively  by  Generals  D.  K.  Jones,  Longstreet,  and  Bonham, 
respectively  supported  by  their  several  appointed  reserves.  .  . 
About  8.30  A.  M.  General  Johnston  and  myself  transferred  our 
headquarters  to  a  central  position,  about  half  a  mile  in  rear  of 
Mitchell's  Ford,  whence  we  might  watch  the  course  of  events. 
...  In  the  meantime,  about  7  o'clock  A.  M.,  Jackson's  brigade, 
with  Imboden's  and  five  pieces  of  Walton's  battery,  had  been  sent 
to  take  up  a  position  along  Bull  Run,  to  guard  the  interval  be 
tween  Cocke's  right  and  Bonham's  left,  with  orders  to  support 
either  in  case  of  need.  ...  So  much  of  Bee's  and  Bartow's 
brigades,  now  united,  as  had  arrived,  some  twenty-eight  hundred 
muskets,  had  also  been  sent  forward  to  support  the  position  of 
the  Stone  Bridge." 

In  his  report,  General  Beauregard  proceeds  to  describe  the 
Federal  movement,  by  Sudley's  Ford,  against  the  Confederate 
left,  and  the  resistance  offered  by  Evans,  Bee  and  Hampton, 
before  these  three  commands  were  forced  back  to  the  plateau 
upon  which  the  main  fighting  occurred  ;  and  he  adds : 

"  From  the  point  previously  indicated,  where  General  John 
ston  and  myself  had  established  our  headquarters,  we  heard  the 
continuous  roll  of  musketry  and  the  sustained  din  of  the  artillery, 
which  announced  the  serious  outburst  of  the  battle  on  our  left 
flank ;  and  we  anxiously,  but  confidently  awaited  similar  sounds 
of  conflict  from  our  front  at  Centre  ville,  resulting  from  the  pre- 


AT   THE   BATTLE   OF   MANASSAS.  17 

scribed  attack  in  that  quarter  by  our  right  wing.      At  half-past 
ten  A.  M.,  however,  this  expectation  was  dissipated  by  a  dispatch 
from  Brigadier-General  Ewell,  informing  me,  to  my  profound 
disappointment,  that  my  orders  for  his  advance  had  miscarried  ; 
but  that  in  consequence  of  a  communication  from  General  D.  K. 
Jones,  he  had  just  thrown  his  brigade  across  the  stream  at  Union 
Mills.     But,  in  my  judgment,  it  was  now  too  late  for  the  effect 
ive  execution  of  the  contemplated  movement,  which  must  have 
required  quite  three  hours  for  the  troops  to  get  into  position  for 
the  attack.     Therefore,  it  became  immediately  necessary  to  de 
pend  on  new  combinations  and  other  dispositions  suited  to  the 
now  pressing  exigency.     The  movement  of  the  right  and  centre, 
already  begun  by  Jones  and  Longstreet,   was  at  once  counter 
manded,  with  the  sanction  of  General  Johnston,  and  we  arranged 
to  meet  the  enemy  on  the  field  upon  which  he  had  chosen  to  give 
us  battle.    .     .     .     These  orders  having  been  duly  dispatched  by 
staff  officers,  at  11.30  A.  M.,  General  Johnston  and  myself  set  out 
for  the  immediate  field  of  action.    ...     As  soon  as  General 
Johnston  and  myself  reached  the  field  we  were  occupied  with  the 
organization  of  the  heroic  troops   whose  previous   stand,    with 
scarce  a  parallel,  has  nothing  more  valiant  in  all  the  pages  of  his 
tory.     ...     It  was  now  that  General  Johnston  impressively 
and  gallantly  charged  to  the  front,   with  the  colors  of  the  4th 
Alabama  regiment  by  his  side,  all  the  field  officers  of  the  regiment 
having  been  previously  disabled.     .     .     ;     As  soon  as  we  had 
thus  rallied  and  disposed  our  forces,  I  urged  General  Johnston  to 
leave  the  immediate  conduct  of  the  field  to  me,  while  he,  repair 
ing  to  Portici  (the  Lewis  house),  should  urge  reinforcements  for 
ward.     At  first  he  was  unwilling,  but,  reminded  that  one  of  us 
must  do  so,  and  that  properly  it  was  his  place,  he  reluctantly,  but 
fortunately  complied  ;  fortunately,  because  from  that  position,  by 
his  energy  and  sagacity,  his  keen  perception  and  anticipations  of 
my  needs,  he  so  directed  the  reserves  as  to  insure  the  success  of 
the  day." 

In  his  report,  General  Bsauregard  describes,  in  detail,  several 
phases  of  the  main  fighting,  and  adds  : 

'JSTow,  full  2  o'clock  p.  M.,  I  gave  the  order  for  the  right  of 
my  line,  except  my  reserves,  to  advance  to  recover  the  plateau.. 


18          GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 

.  .  .  The  Federal  lines  were  broken  and  swept  back  at  all 
points  from  the  open  ground  of  the  plateau.  Rallying  soon, 
however,  as  they  were  strongly  reinforced  by  fresh  regiments, 
the  Federalists  returned,  and,  by  weight  of  numbers,  pressed  our 
lines  back,  recovered  their  ground  and  guns,  and  renewed  the 
offensive.  By  this  time,  between  half -past  2  and  3  o'clock  p.  M., 
our  reinforcements  pushed  forward,  and,  directed  by  General 
Johnston  to  the  required  quarter,  were  at  hand  just  as  I  had 
ordered  forward,  to  a  second  effort  for  the  recovery  of  the  plateau, 
the  whole  line,  including  my  reserve,  which,  at  this  crisis  of  the 
battle,  I  felt  called  upon  to  lead  in  person.  .  .  .  The  whole 
open  ground  was  again  swept  clear  of  the  enemy,  and  the  plateau 
around  the  Henry  and  Robinson  houses  remained  fully  in  our 
possession.  .  .  .  While  the  enemy  had  thus  been  driven 
back  on  our  right,  entirely  across  the  turnpike,  and  beyond 
Young's  Branch  on  our  left,  the  woods  yet  swarmed  with  them, 
when  our  reinforcements  opportunely  arrived  in  quick  succession 
and  took  position  in  that  part  of  the  field." 

After  describing  the  operations  that  immediately  followed  on 
the  left,  General  Beauregard  continues  his  report :  "  Another 
important  accession  to  our  forces  had  also  occurred  about  the 
same  time — 3  o'clock  p.  M.  Brigadier-General  E.  K.  Smith,  with 
some  seventeen  hundred  infantry  of  Elzey's  brigade  of  the  Army 
of  the  Shenandoah,  and  Beckham's  battery,  came  upon  the  field, 
from  Camp  Pickens,  Manassas,  where  they  had  arrived,  by  rail 
road,  at  noon.  [They  were]  directed  by  a  staff  officer,  sent  in 
person  by  General  Johnston  to  the  left,  then  so  much  endan 
gered.  .  .  . 

"  Colonel  Early,  who  by  some  mischance  did  not  receive  orders 
until  2  o'clock,  which  had  been  sent  him  at  noon,  came  on  the 
ground  immdiately  after  Elzey.  .  .  .  [Early's]  brigade,  by  the 
personal  direction  of  General  Johnston,  was  marched  by  the  Hoik- 
ham  house  across  the  fields  to  the  left  entirely  around  the  woods 
through  which  Elzey  had  passed,  and,  under  a  severe  fire,  into  a 
position  in  line  of  battle,  near  Chinn's  house,  outflanking  the 
enemy's  right.  .  .  .  Under  this  combined  attack  the  enemy 
was  soon  forced  .  .  .  back  over  Young's  Branch  and  the 
turnpike  into  the  fields  of  the  Dogan  farm,  and  rearward,  in 


AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  19 

extreme  disorder,  across  the  country  in  all  available  directions, 
towards  Bull  Run.  The  rout  had  now  become  general  and  com 
plete.  .  .  .  Elzey's  brigade  .  .  .  pursued  the  now  panic- 
stricken,  fugitive  enemy.  Stuart,  with  his  cavalry,  and  Beckham 
had  also  taken  up  the  pursuit  along  the  road  by  which  the  enemy 
had  come  upon  the  field  that  morning.  ... 

"  The  centre  brigades,  Bonhanr's  and  Longstreet's,  of  the  line 
of  Bull  Run,  if  not  closely  engaged,  were,  nevertheless,  exposed 
for  much  of  the  day  to  annoying,  almost  incessant,  fire  of 
artillery  of  long  range.  .  .  .  They  held,  virtually  paralyzed, 
all  day,  two  strong  brigades  of  the  enemy,  with  their  batteries. 
.  .  .  Longstreet's  brigade,  pursuant  to  orders  prescribing  his  part 
of  the  operations  of  the  centre  and  right  wing,  was  thrown  across 
Bull  Run  early  in  the  morning,  and,  under  a  severe  fire  of  artil 
lery,  was  skillfully  disposed  for  the  assault  of  the  enemy's  bat 
teries  in  that  quarter,  but  was  withdrawn  subsequently  in  con 
sequence  of  the  change  of  plan  already  mentioned  and  ex 
plained.  .  .  .  After  the  rout,  having  been  ordered  by  Gen 
eral  Johnston  in  pursuit,  in  the  direction  of  Centreville,  these 
[two]  brigades  advanced  nearly  to  that  place,  when,  night  and 
darkness  intervening,  General  Bonham  thought  it  proper  to  di 
rect  his  own  brigade,  and  that  of  General  Longstreet,  back  to 
Bull  Run. 

"  General  D.  R.  Jones,  early  in  the  day,  crossing  Bull  Run 
with  his  brigade,  pursuant  to  orders  indicating  his  part  in  the 
projected  attack  by  our  right  wing  and  centre  on  the.  enemy  at 
Centreville,  took  up  a  position  on  the  Union  Mills  and  Centre 
ville  road,  more  than  a  mile  in  advance  of  the  Run.  Ordered 
back  in  consequence  of  the  miscarriage  of  the  orders  to  General 
Ewell,  the  retrograde  movement  was  necessarily  made  under  a 
sharp  fire  of  artillery.  At  noon  this  brigade,  in  obedience  to 
new  instructions,  was  again  thrown  across  Bull  Run  to  make  a  dem 
onstration.  Unsupported  by  other  troops,  the  advance  was 
gallantly  made  until  within  musket-range  of  the  enemy's  force, 
Colonel  Davies'  brigade,  in  position  near  Rocky  Run. 
Not  only  did  the  return-fire  of  the  brigade  [Jones']  drive  to 
cover  the  enemy's  infantry,  but  the  [knowledge  of  that]  move 
ment  unquestionably  spread  through  the  enemy's  ranks  a  sense  of 


20  GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUBEGABD 

insecurity  and  danger  from  an  attack  by  that  route  on  their  rear 
at  Centreville,  which  served  to  augment  the  extraordinary  panic 
which  we  know  disbanded  the  entire  Federal  army  for  the 
time.  .  .  . 

"  General  Ewell,  occupying  for  the  time  the  right  of  the  lines 
of  Bull  Run  at  Union  Mills  Ford — after  the  miscarriage  of  my 
orders  for  his  advance  upon  Centreville — in  the  afternoon,  was 
ordered  by  General  Johnston  to  bringjip  his  brigade  into  battle, 
then  raging  on  the  left  flank.  Promptly  executed  as  this  move 
ment  was  the  brigade,  after  a  severe  march,  reached  the  field  too 
late  to  share  the  glories,  as  they  had  the  labors,  of  the  day.  As 
the  important  position  at  the  Union  Mills  had  been  left  with  but 
a  slender  guard,  General  Ewell  was  at  once  ordered  to  retrace  his 
steps  and  resume  his  position,  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  its 
seizure  by  any  force  of  the  enemy  in  that  quarter.  Brigadier- 
General  Holmes,  left  with  his  brigade  as  a  support  to  the  same 
position,  in  the  original  plan  of  battle,  had  also  been  called  to 
the  left,  whither  he  inarched  with  the  utmost  speed,  but  not  in 
tims  to  join  actively  in  the  battle.  .  .  . 

"  It  must  be  permitted  me  here  to  record  my  profound  sense 
of  my  obligation  to  General  Johnston,  for  his  generous  permis 
sion  to  carry  out  my  plans,  with  such  modifications  as  circum 
stances  had  required.  From  his  services  on  the  field — as  we 
entered  it  together,  as  already  mentioned — and  his  subsequent 
watchful  management  of  the  reinforcements  as  they  reached  the 
vicinity  of  the  field,  our  countrymen  may  draw  the  most  aus 
picious  auguries.  .  .  . 

"  In  the  conclusion  of  this  report  it  is  proper,  and,  doubtless, 
expected,  that  I  should  acquaint  my  countrymen  with  some  of 
the  sufficient  causes  that  prevented  the  advance  of  our  forces  and 
prolonged  vigorous  pursuit  of  the  enemy  to  and  beyond  the 
Potomac.  The  War  Department  has  been  fully  advised,  long 
since,  of  all  those  causes,  some  of  which  only  are  proper  to  be  here 
communicated.  An  army  which  had  fought  as  ours  that  day, 
against  uncommon  odds,  under  a  July  sun,  most  of  the  time 
without  water  and  without  food,  except  a  hastily  snatched  meal 
at  dawn,  was  not  in  condition  for  the  toil  of  an  eager,  effective 
pursuit  of  an  enemy  immediately  after  the  battle.  On  the  fol- 


AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  21 

lowing  day  an  unusually  heavy  and  unintermitting  fall  of  rain 
intervened  to  obstruct  our  advance,  with  reasonable  prospects  of 
fruitful  results.  Added  to  this,  the  want  cf  a  cavalry  force  of 
sufficient  numbers  made  an  efficient  pursuit  a  military  impossi 
bility." 

The  whole  tenor  of  General  Beauregard's  official  report 
shows  conclusively  that  he  considered  himself  in  active  com 
mand,  hy  authority  of  General  Johnston,  subject,  of  course,  to 
the  orders  of  the  senior  in  rank  on  the  field  whenever  the  latter 
chose  to  exercise  the  power  which  that  rank  gave  him. 

In  addition,  the  records  show  that,  in  an  official  letter,  dated 
August  16th,  1861,  addressed  to  General  T.  J.  Jackson,  General 
Beauregard  said  :  "  I  commanded  in  person  on  the  field  on  that 
occasion,  being  responsible  for  the  success  or  failure  of  that 
battle." 

In  view  of  the  u  record -facts,"  it  is  not  at  all  probable  that 
General  Johnston  is  correct,  when  he  says  :  General  Beauregard, 
"as  the  younger  officer,"  "  claimed  "  to  be  "  assigned  to  the  com 
mand  of  the  left."  There  is  no  shade  of  ambiguity  in  any  por 
tion  of  General  Beauregard's  official  report ;  and  it  is  especially 
clear  in  contemporaneously  asserting  that  he  was  in  command  of 
the  combined  Confederate  forces. 

If  Beauregard's  statements  on  this  subject  were  not  true,  it 
was  General  Johnston's  duty,  at  the  time,  to  stamp  out  such  pre 
sumption  on  the  part  of  a  junior  in  rank.  General  Johnston 
restricted  himself  to  the  terms  of  his  own  official  report,  which 
— but  for  Beauregard's  official  report — would  seem  to  show  that 
Johnston  had  not  intrusted  the  active  command  to  Beauregard. 

Whilst  a  difference  of  color,  in  that  respect,  is  plainly  discern 
ible  in  the  reports  of  these  two  army  commanders,  nothing  is 
found,  in  the  somewhat  guarded  expressions  used  by  General 
Johnston,  which,  when  fairly  construed,  could  well  be  placed  in 
direct  conflict  with  the  specific  statements,  made  by  General 
Beauregard  in  his  official  report,  in  regard  to  the  active  command 
of  the  combined  Confederate  forces. 

It  was,  therefore,  not  to  be  expected  that  the  latter — a  junior 
in  rank — would  feel  it  to  be  incumbent  on  him,  at  the  time,  to 


22  GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUKEGARD 

make  special  objection  to  the  tone  of  the  report  of  the  former  in 
reference  to  that  question. 

Farther  quotations  from  the  official  records  will  now  be  given 
in  illustration  of  the  partial  movements  made  by  the  Confederate 
right  and  centre,  under  the  "  second  plan  "  ordered  by  Beaure- 
gard. 

In  the  official  report  of  General  D.  K.  Jones  it  is  stated  : 

"  At  7.10  A.  M.  [July  21],  the  following  order  was  received  : 

"  <  General  Ewell  has  been  ordered  to  take  the  offensive  upon 
Centreville.  You  will  follow  the  movement  at  once  by  attacking 
him  [the  enemy]  in  your  front,'  signed  '  G.  T.  Beauregard.' 

"  I  immediately  placed  my  brigade  in  readiness  to  advance, 
and  dispatched  a  messenger  to  communicate  with  General  Ewell, 
whose  movement  I  was  to  follow.  Not  receiving  a  prompt  re 
ply,  I  crossed  McLean's  Ford,  and  took  position  with  my  artillery 
in  battery  on  the  Union  Mills  road,  .  .  .  which  the  enemy 
held  with  a  strong  force  of  artillery,  infantry,  and  cavalry.  I 
here  awaited  the  advance  of  General  Ewell  for  about  two  hours 
and  a  half.  .  .  .  The  following  positive  order  [was  received] 
through  Colonel  Chisholm : 

" '  10.30  A.  M. — General  Jones  :  On  account  of  the  diffi 
culties*  in  our  front  it  is  thought  preferable  to  countermand  the 
advance  of  the  right  wing.  Resume  your  former  position.  G. 
T.  Beauregard.' 

"  Upon  reaching  the  entrenchments  General  Ewell  sent  me  an 
order  he  had  received  from  General  Beauregard,  upon  which 
was  the  following  indorsement,  viz.  : 

"  '  The  General  [Ewell]  says  this  is  the  only  order  he  has 
received.  It  implies  he  is  to  receive  another.  Send  this  to 
General  Beauregard  if  you  think  proper.'  Signed,  '  Fitz  Lee, 
Acting  Assistant  Adjutant-General.' 

"  Shortly  after  this  I  was  requested  by  General  Longstreet  to 
make  a  demonstration  in  his  favor  on  my  front,  followed  by  an 
order  from  General  Beauregard,  borne  by  Mr.  Terry,  11.30 

*  The  "  difficulties  "  here  referred  to  were  caused  by  the  miscarriage  of  the 
order  to  Ewell.  The  Federals,  then  pressing  on  the  Confederate  left,  made  it 
seem  injudicious,  at  that  time,  for  the  Confederate  right  and  centre  to  con 
tinue  the  long-delayed  movement  against  the  left  and  rear  of  the  Federals. 


AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  23 

A.  M.,  to  advance  upon  the  enemy  up  Eocky  Bun,  co-operating 
with  General  Ewell  on  my  right  and  General  Longstreet  on  my 
left.  I  recrossed  the  ford,  .  .  .  and  retraced  my  route  to 
the  position  I  had  occupied  in  the  morning  and  thence  en 
deavored  to  communicate  with  General  Ewell.  Failing  in  this, 
I  notified  General  Longstreet  that  I  was  advancing  to  the 
assault.'' 

General  Jones  describes  the  spirited  conflict  in  which  his  bri 
gade  became  hotly  engaged  for  several  hours,  but  with  varying 
success,  and  adds  : 

"  Although  the  main  object  of  our  attack— the  possession  of 
the  battery — was  not  attained,  the  effect  of  our  operations,  I  am 
glad  to  believe,  was  none  the  less  important  in  working  out  the 
grand  issues  of  the  day.  The  enemy  left,  in  panic,  the  strong  posi 
tion  from  which  he  completely  commanded  several  fords  of  Bull 
Run  and  the  adjacent  country  for  miles  around." 

There  can  hardly  be  a  well  founded  difference  of  opinion  as  to 
what  would  have  been  the  probable  result,  if  the  order  to  Ewell  to 
attack  had  been  received  by  the  latter,  about  7  A.  M.,  and  the  Con 
federate  right  and  centre  had  fallen  upon  the  left  flank  and  the 
rear  of  the  Federals  whilst  one-half  of  McDowell's  army  was  mak 
ing  a  wide,  detached  movement  to  the  north,  on  a  narrow  country 
road,  through  dense  woods,  to  cross  Bull  Run  at  Sudley's  Ford, 
two  miles  beyond  the  extreme  Confederate  left. 

Resuming  an  examination  of  the  official  records  it  is  found 
that  a  few  hours  after  the  battle  ended,  President  Davis  addressed 
the  following  letter  to  General  Beauregard  : 

"  Appreciating  your  services  in  the  battle  of  Manassas  and  on 
several  other  occasions  during  the  existing  war,  as  affording  the 
highest  evidence  of  your  skill  as  a  commander,  your  gallantry  as 
a  soldier,  and  your  zeal  as  a  patriot,  you  are  appointed  to  be 
general  in  the  army  of  the  Confederate  States  of  America,  and, 
with  the  consent  of  Congress,  will  be  duly  commissioned  accord 
ingly." 

On  the  21th  of  that  month,  the  Confederate  States  Secretary 
of  War  wrote  to  General  Beauregard  : 

"  Accept  my  congratulations  for  the  glorious  and  most  brilliant 
victory  achieved  by  you.5' 


GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 

On  the  same  day,  General  E.  E.  Lee,  in  a  letter  to  General 
Beauregard  said  : 

"  I  cannot  express  the  joy  I  feel  at  the  brilliant  victory  of  the 
21st.  The  skill,  courage,  and  endurance  displayed  by  yourself 
excite  my  highest  admiration.  You  and  your  troops  have  the 
gratitude  of  the  whole  country,  and  I  offer  to  all  my  heartfelt 
congratulations  at  their  success." 

On  the  next  day  a  congratulatory  address  was  jointly  issued 
to  the  combined  Confederate  forces,  by  Generals  Johnston  and 
Beauregard : 

"  Soldiers  of  the  Confederate  States  : 

"  One  week  ago  a  countless  host  of  men,  organized  into  an 
army,  with  all  the  appointments  which  modern  art  and  practical 
skill  could  devise,  invaded  the  soil  of  Virginia.  .  .  . 

.  .  .  We,  your  generals  commanding,  are  enabled,  in 
the  name  of  our  whole  country,  to  thank  you  for  that  patriotic 
courage,  that  heroic  gallantry,  that  devoted  daring,  exhibited  by 
you  in  the  actions  of  the  18th  and  21st,  by  which  the  hosts  of 
the  enemy  were  scattered,  and  a  signal  and  glorious  victory  ob 
tained. 

"  The  two  affairs  of  the  18th  and  21st  were  but  the  sustained 
and  continued  effort  of  your  patriotism  against  the  constantly 
recurring  columns  of  an  enemy  fully  treble  your  numbers.  .  .  . 

"  Comrades,  our  brothers  who  have  fallen  have  earned  un 
dying  renown  upon  earth.  .  .  . 

u  Soldiers,  we  congratulate  you  on  a  glorious,  triumphant 
and  complete  victory,  and  we  thank  you  for  doing  your  whole 
duty  in  the  service  of  your  country. 

"  J.  E.  JOHNSTON, 

General,  C.  S.  Army. 
"  G.  T.  BEADREGARD, 

General,  C.  S.  Army." 

On  the  12th  of  September,  1861,  General  Johnston  wrote  to 
President  Davis : 

"  My  rank  was  expressly  recognized  by  Congress  also  in  the 
resolutions  adopted  by  that  body  returning  the  thanks  of  Con 
gress  to  General  Johnston,  to  General  Beauregard,  and  to  the 


AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  25 

officers  and  soldiers  of  the  army  for  the  victory  at  Manassas. 
.  .  .  My  noble  associate  with  me  in  the  battle  has  his  pre 
ferment  connected  with  the  victory  won  by  our  common  trials 
and  dangers.  His  commission  bears  the  date  of  July  21,  1861, 
but  care  seems  to  have  been  taken  to  exclude  the  idea  that  I  had 
any  part  in  winning  our  triumph."  * 

General  Beauregard's  official  report,  as  well  as  that  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  was  made  to  the  Adjutant  and  Inspector-General 
of  the  Confederate  States  Army  at  Kichmond.  These  two  reports, 
taken  together,  must  be  accepted  as  the  true  Confederate  history 
of  what  occurred  at  the  battle  of  Manassas,  unless  they  are  modi 
fied  by  other  official  records  of  the  time,  or  by  facts,  proved  by 
incontestible  testimony,  developed  later.  There  are  some  dis 
crepancies,  as  already  noted,  between  the  respective  reports  of 
these  two  army  commanders.  But  there  seems  to  be  no  direct 
and  positive  conflict  in  their  statements  when  a  fair  attempt  is 
made  to  adjust  their  combined  meaning. 

The  official  records  in  regard  to  this  first  great  battle  of  the 
Secession  War,  show  conclusively  that  each  of  the  two  ranking 
Confederate  officers  acquired  great  and  deserved  distinction  for 
services  in  connection  with  that  action.  These  two  commanders 
were  personal  friends — they  were  both  gallant  and  able  soldiers 
—on  that  field  they  were  close  allies — and,  in  spite  of  some  ad 
verse  circumstances,  their  combined  forces  gained  a  signal  victory. 

But  not  content  with  the  official  records,  General  Johnston, 
in  1874,  published  a  "  Narrative,"  in  which — without  proofs — 
lie  claimed  more  credit  than  was  justly  his  due — attacked  the 
correctness  of  General  Beauregard's  official  report,  and  attempted 
to  depreciate  the  character  of  the  services  rendered  by  the  com- 
mandor  next  in  rank  to  himself.  He  seems  to  have  assumed 
that  his  new  version  of  these  operations  must  be  now  accepted  as 
correct,  because  he  was  the  senior  general  present.  He  thus 
became  an  aggressor,  and  forced  a  close  discussion  of  his  later 
claims. 


*  Compare  the  limitations  of  that  letter  with  the  recent  wholesale  claims 
and  attempt  to  jostle  General  Beauregard  out  of  all  share,  even,  except  as  an 
executive  subordinate. 


26 


GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 


In  an  article  published  in  the  Century  Magazine,' 'May,  1885r 
he  repeated,  emphasized  and  enlarged  the  statements  made  in 
his  "Narrative." 

If  his  new  claims  in  his  own  behalf  are  well  founded,  the 
Confederate  official  records  of  this  battle  are  wof  uilj  misleading, 
and  the  concurrent  opinion  of  the  Confederate  Army,  the  Go  var 
ment  and  the  people,  in  attributing  to  General  Beauregard  a 
very  large  share  of  credit  for  the  victory  gained  at  Manassas,  was 
based  upon  a  misapprehension  of  the  facts. 

In  the  preface  to  his  1874  "Narrative,"  General  Johnston 
says :  "  I  offer  these  pages  as  my  contribution  of  materials  for 
the  use  of  the  future  historian  of  the  War  between  the  States." 
It  is  proposed  to  group  some  of  his  more  important  claims 
under  headings  numbered  from  1  to  8.  Then,  at  the  risk  of 
tedious  repetitions  of  testimony,  the  statements  contained  in  each 
of  those  groups  will  be  compared  with  the  official  records  made 
in  1861,  including  his  own  official  report,  and  such  comments 
will  be  added  as  may  seem  to  be  required  in  order  to  fairly 
illustrate  his  "contributions"  and  elucidate  the  truth. 


AT   THE   BATTLE   OF   MAXASSAS.  27 


PAKT  II. 
General  Johnstons  (1874-85)  Claims  Considered. 

1.  He  would  now  have  it  believed  that  "  Johnston  knew 
the  value  of  concentration  for  a  fight.  He  played  with  Patterson, 
reinforced  Beau  regard,  and  won  a  victory.'' 

The  official  records  show  that  the  strategic  elements  in  these 
Confederate  operations — the  transfer  of  forces  from  the  Valley 
of  Virginia  to  Manassas — emanated  from  General  Beauregard. 
He  notified  the  Government  at  Richmond  that  the  advance  upon 
his  position  by  the  main  Federal  Army  from  Washington  was 
imminent— that  he  had  decided  to  concentrate  his  army  on  the 
line  of  Bull  Run,  and  that  he  would  attack  the  Federals  east  of 
that  stream  when  they  closely  approached  his  position.  At  the 
same  time  he  suggested  that  the  line  of  Bull  Run  was  the  place 
at  which  the  forces  under  General  Johnston  could  best  be  used. 
But  his  decision  to  fight  near  Bull  Run  was  formed  irrespective 
of  any  aid  he  might,  or  might  not,  receive  from  General 
Johnston. 

On  the  17th  of  July  he  informed  the  Government  and  General 
Johnston  that  his  outposts  at  Fairfax  Court-house  had  been 
driven  in  and  McDowell's  army  was  advancing.  On  the  same 
day  the  Government  ordered  General  Johnston  to  move  his  forces 
from  Winchester  to  Manassas.  That  order  was  received  by 
General  Johnston  at  1  A.  M.  on  the  18th.  He  replied  :  "  General 
Patterson  seems  to  have  moved  yesterday  to  Charlestown,  twenty- 
three  miles  to  the  east  of  Winchester.  Unless  he  prevents  it,f  we 
shall  move  towards  General  Beauregard  to-day." 

*  Quoted  from  a  notice  of  "  Johnston's  Narrative"  in  the  New  York  Even 
ing  Mail,  April,  1874.  See  "  Battle  of  Manassas,"  Beauregard,  p.  129. 

f  In  his  "  Narrative,"  General  Johnston  says:  "The  only  question  was, 
whether  to  attempt  to  defeat  or  to  elude  General  Patterson."  Whilst  Johnston 
hesitated,  General  Beauregard's  Adjutant-General  telegraphed  him:  "For 
God's  sake  come  at  once."  If  he  had  then  attempted  to  defeat  Patterson,  there 
would  have  been  no  possibility  of  Johnston's  reinforcing  Beauregard  before  the 
latter  had  either  won  or  lost  the  battle  of  Manassas. 


GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 

Twelve  hours  later  one  brigade  started.  It  arrived  at  ilanassas 
on  the  19th.  General  Johnston  in  person,  with  an  additional 
tachment,  reached  that  place  about  noon  on  the  20th.  En 
route  he  received  a  telegram  from  President  Davis:  «  You  will 
know  how  to  make  the  exact  knowledge  of  Brigadier-General 
Beauregard,  as  well  of  the  ground  as  of  the  troops  and  prepara 
tion,  avail  for  the  success  of  the  object  in  which  you  co-operate." 
On  the  18th  the  Federals  had  moved  against  Beauregard's 
line  on  Bull  Eun  and  were  checked.  Beauregard  refrained  from 
then  making  a  counter-attack,  because  he  had  reason  to  suppose 
he  would  soon  receive  aid  from  Johnston. 

In  the  face  of  the  « record-facts,"  it  is  worse  than  idle  to 
claim,  at  this  late  day,  that  General  Johnston  is  entitled  to  full 
credit  for  the  strategy,  on  the  Confederate  side,  which  resulted 
in  the  first  great  battle  of  the  Secession  War.  There  was  cer- 
linly,  on  his  part,  nothing  "Napoleonic"  in  the  conception,  or 
m  the  execution,  of  the  movement  he  was  ordered  to  make  from 
Winchester  to  Manassas. 

2.  He  now  says  that,  immediately  after  his  arrival  at  Ma 
nassas,  he  told  General  Beauregard  the  enemy  must  be  attacked 
as  soon  as  possible  next  morning;  that  he  (Johnston)  sketched 
a  simple  order  of  march  which  he  begged  General  Beauregard  to 
have  prepared  and  submitted  to  him  for  inspection  so  that  the 
order  of  march  could  be  distributed  to  the  troops  before  night ; 
that  the  papers  were  not  presented  to  him  until  after  daylight  on 
the  21st ;  that  they  differed  in  great  degree  from  the  order 
sketched  the  afternoon  of  the  previous  day,  but  as  they  would 
"put  the  troops  in  motion  if  distributed,  it  would  be  easy  then 
to  direct  the  course  of  each  division."  He  adds  :  "  The  papers  " 
"  were  not  written  in  the  form  usual  in  the  United  States  Army, 
being  written  by  General  Beauregard's  Adjutant-General  in  his 
name,  my  sanction  to  be  written  on  each  copy.  This  was  too 
immaterial  to  be  worth  correction,  for  the  troops  should  then 
have  been  in  motion." 

In  contrast  with  these  "After-thoughts"  of  General  Johnston 
it  is  well  to  place  here  the  following  extracts  from  his  own  official 
report.  In  that  report  he  says :  "  I  found  General  Beauregard's 
position  too  extensive,  and  the  ground  too  densely  wooded  and 


AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  29 

intricate,  to  be  learned  in  the  brief  time  at  my  disposal,  and 
therefore  determined  to  rely  upon  his  knowledge  of  it  and 
of  the  enemy's  position.  .  .  .  During  the  evening  it  was 
determined,  instead  of  remaining  in  the  defensive  positions  then 
occupied,  to  assume  the  offensive  and  attack  the  enemy.  .  .  . 
General  Eeauregard  proposed  a  plan  of  battle,  which  I  approved 
without  hesitation.  He  drew  up  the  necessary  order  during  the 
night,  which  was  approved  formally  by  me  at  4.30  o'clock,  on 
the  morning  of  the  21st.'' 

General  Eeauregard,  in  his  official  report,  says :  "  General 
Johnston  arrived  here  about  noon  on  the  20th  of  July,  and  being 
my  senior  in  rank,  he  necessarily  assumed  command  of  all  the 
forces  of  the  Confederate  States  then  concentrating  at  this  point. 
Made  acquainted  with  my  plan  of  operations  and  dispositions  to 
meet  the  enemy,  he  gave  them  his  entire  approval,  and  gener 
ously  directed  their  execution  under  my  command." 

In  view  of  the  two  foregoing  quotations,  there  is  no  justifica 
tion  for  General  Johnston's  asserting — that : 

He  told  General  Beauregard  the  enemy  must  be  attacked. 

He  sketched  a  simple  order  of  march,  which  he  begged  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  to  have  prepared  before  night. 

He  signed  a  simple  order  of  march  about  daylight  on  the  21st, 
merely  that  the  troops  might  be  put  in  motion  ;  because  it  would 
then  be  easy  for  him  to  direct  the  movements  of  perfectly  raw 
troops  over  very  extended,  wooded  and  difficult  country — and  fight 
a  battle  upon  ground  with  which  he  was  not  even  acquainted. 

"  The  papers,"  now  in  question,  were  the  orders  for  battle  ; 
see  Appendix  A.  They  were  not  written  by  General  Beaure- 
gard's  Adjutant-General,  and  they  did  not  differ  from  the  order 
of  battle  "determined"  upon  "during  the  evening"  of  the 
20th.* 

*  "  The  order ';  "  was  written  by  Major  [W.  H.  C.]  Whiting,  General  John 
ston's  own  confidential  staff  officer,  under  General  Beauregard's  dictation,  for 
the  reason  that  Colonel  Jordan,  the  latter's  Adjutant  General,  was  asleep  at  the 
time  under  [the  influence  of]  a  narcotic,  which  had  been  administered  by  Dr. 
Nott,  of  Mobile,  on  account  of  nervous  exhaustion  from  his  almost  sleepless 
labors  of  nearly  two  weeks  previous. 

"  When  those  orders,  thus  issued,  because  of  the  express  understanding  that 
General  Beauregard  should  be  in  command  of  the  field  for  execution  of  opera- 


30  GENERALS   JOHNSTON   AND   BEAUREGAIID 

3.  In  reference  to  the  "  second  plan  "  General  Johnston  as 
serts  that :  u  Three  of  the  four  brigades  of  the  first  line,  at  Mitch 
ell's,  Blackburn's,  and  McLean's  Fords,  reported  strong  bodies 
of  United  States  troops  on  the  wooded  heights  before  them.  This 
frustrated  the  second  plan"  "  Perhaps  fortunately." 

Beauregard's./^  plan— see  Appendix  A— required  that  the 
combined  Confederate  forces  should  cross  Bull  Eun  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  21st,  and  attack  the  Federals.  All  the  accounts, 
then  and  later,  agree  in  stating  that,  at  5.30  A.  M.  on  the  21st,  it 
was  reported  that  large  bodies  of  Federal  troops  had  advanced,  on 
and  near  the  Warrenton  turnpike,  to  the  vicinity  of  Stone  Bridge 
—the  Confederate  left.  On  receipt  of  that  information,  Beaure- 
gard,  with  the  approval  of  General  Johnston,  ordered  the  left  to 
stand  on  the  defensive  ;  and  the  right  and  centre  to  cross  Bull 
Eun  and  attack  the  left  flank  and  rear  of  the  Federals  between 
that  stream  and  Centreville.  This  is  what  is  referred  to  as  the 
"  second  plan.'5 

On  its  face,  General  Johnston's  assertion  that  the  attack,  which 
the  Confederate  right  and  centre  were  ordered  to  make,  was 
"frustrated"  by  the  "  reported"  appearance  of  the  Federals  in 
their  front,  is  worse  than  absurd.  In  reference  to  that  attack  it 
has  already  been  stated  he  simply  says,  in  his  official  report  : 

"This,  too,  became  impracticable!"  But  General  Beaure- 
gard's  official  report  states  that  : 

"  Informed  at  5.30  A.  M.,  by  Colonel  Evans,  that  the  enemy 
had  deployed  ...  in  his  immediate  front,  I  at  once  ordered 

tions,  were  taken  to  Colonel  Jordan  in  the  morning  of  the  21st  of  July,  for  his 
official  signature,  he,  a  staff  officer  of  long  experience,  inasmuch  as  the  troops 
of  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah  were  embraced  as  well  as  those  of  the  Army 
of  the  Potomac,  appended  of  his  own  prompting,  the  paragraph  of  approval 
for  General  Johnston,  and  in  person  took  to  him  for  his  signature  only  such 
copies  as  were  to  be  sent  to  the  Army  of  the  Shenandoah,  in  order,  as  he  stated  to 
him  at  the  moment,  to  secure  beyond  the  possibility  of  accident  their  complete 
recognition  by  the  Shenandoah  troops. 

"  Not  a  word  or  indication  of  objection  as  to  the  form  or  tenor  of  the  docu 
ment  was  made  by  General  Johnston,  though  the  fact  that  General  Beuure- 
gard  was  to  exercise  the  command  of  all  the  Confederate  forces  in  that  day's 
operations  was  thus  made  a  matter  of  record."  See  "Battle  of  Manassas, 
Beauregard,"  p.  60. 


AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  31 

him,  as  also  General  Cocke,  if  attacked,  to  maintain  their  position 
to  the  last  extremity.  In  my  opinion,  the  most  effective  method 
of  relieving  that  flank  was  by  a  rapid,  determined  attack  with 
my  right  wing  and  centre,  on  the  enemy's  flank  and  rear  at 
Centreville.  ...  By  such  a  movement  I  confidently  ex 
pected  to  achieve  a  complete  victory  "  "  by  12  meridian."  u  These 
new  dispositions  were  submitted  to  General  Johnston,  who  fully 
approved  them,  and  the  orders  for  their  immediate  execution 
were  at  once  issued.  Brigadier-General  Ewell  was  directed  to 
begin  the  movement,  to  be  followed  and  supported  successively 
by  Generals  D.  R.  Jones,  Longstreet  and  Bonham,  respectively  sup 
ported  by  their  several  appointed  reserves.  .  .  From  tlie  point 
previously  indicated,  where  General  Johnston  and  myself  had 
established  our  headquarters,  we  heard  the  continuous  roll  of 
musketry  and  the  sustained  din  of  artillery,  which  announced  the 
serious  outburst  of  the  battle  on  our  left  flank ;  and  we  anxiously, 
but  confidently,  awaited  similar  sounds  of  conflict  from  our  front 
at  Centreville,  resulting  from  the  prescribed  attack  in  that 
quarter  by  our  right  wing.  At  half -past  ten,  however,  this 
expectation  was  dissipated  by  a  despatch  from  Brigadier-General 
Ewell,  informing  me,  to  my  profound  disappointment,  that  my 
orders  for  his  advance  had  miscarried." 

In  a  letter  addressed  to  General  Ewell,  within  a  month  after 
the  battle,  General  Beauregard  expressed  regret  that  his  order 
for  attack  "  could  not  be  carried  into  effect,  as  it  would  have  been 
a  more  complete  victory  with  only  half  the  trouble  and  fighting." 

General  Johnston  approved  the  "  second  plan  "  at  the  time, 
and  would  now  have  it  believed — in  face  of  the  official  state 
ments  made  then  by  General  Beauregard— that  it  was  "perhaps," 
fortunate  that  this  plan  was  "  frustrated  !  " 

In  this  connection  the  following  extracts  from  "Battle  of 
Manassas,  Beauregard,"  will  not  be  found  irrelevant :  * 

"Upon  our  part,  a  determined  resistance,  nerved  by  the 
excellent  conduct  of  our  troops  in  the  repulse  of  the  Federals  on 
the  18th,  was  trusted  by  General  Beauregard  to  defend  the 
crossing  [in  front  of  the  Confederate  left]  sufficiently  to  allow 

*  See  pages  66  to  70  of  that  work. 


32  GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUKEGARD 

time  for  our  corps  of  attack  [the  Confederate  right  and 
centre]  to  make  their  own  offensive  movement  felt  upon  the 
enemy's  line,  the  left  of  which,  wherever  found  between  Bull 
Kun  and  Centreville,  would  have  been  taken  in  flank  and  rear. 
The  resistance  afterwards  maintained  by  Evans,  Bee  and  Bartow 
to  the  entire  flanking  column  fully  approved  this  opinion.  But 
instead  of  an  attempt  by  the  Federal  army  to  cross  at  and  near 
Stone  Bridge,  it  was  divided  into  two  forces,  one  of  which,  a 
column  14,000  strong,  was  detached  in  the  early  morning  from 
the  right  of  the  Warrenton  turnpike  through  a  narrow,  deep-cut 
road,  hedged  on  both  sides  by  a  dense  second-growth  forest,  over 
a  distance  of  six  miles  up  to  Sudley  Ford,  where  it  was  to  cross, 
and  thence  march  down  on  our  left  flank,  while  the  remainder 
were  distributed  as  follows  :  Schenck's  brigade,  in  front  of  the 
Stone  Bridge,  and  extending  about  half  a  mile  below  it ;  Sher 
man's  brigade,  to  the  rear  and  right  of  Schenck,  its  left  resting 
on  the  Warrenton  turnpike  ;  Keyes'  brigade,  still  further  to  the 
rear  on  the  turnpike ;  that  is,  Sherman  and  Keyes  were  disposed 
on  the  Warrenton  turnpike  between  Stone  Bridge  and  Cub  Run  ; 
Davies'  brigade  and  Richardson's,  united  with  the  command  of 
Davies,  were  thrown  forward  in  front  of  Blackburn's  Ford,  and 
extending  to  the  vicinity  of  McLean's  Ford,  thus  isolated  at  a 
distance  of  about  three  miles  from  Schenck's,  Sherman's  and 
Keyes'  brigades,  and  from  Blencker's  brigade  at  Centreville. 

"  By  directing  that  detached  column  of  14,000  men  through 
a  defile  of  thick  wood6  to  Sudley  Ford,  the  Federal  commander 
had  done  what  nothing  but  the  happiest  manoeuvres  on  our  part 
could  have  accomplished ;  for  he  had  thus  cut  his  army  in  two 
and  sent  nearly  the  select  half  of  it  for  several  hours  away  from 
the  field.  .  .  . 

"  During  the  time  of  this  circuitous  march  of  the  Federals 
our  line  of  battle  from  Mitchell's  Ford  to  the  extreme  right  at 
Union  Mills  Ford,  should  have  been  executing  the  offensive  move 
ment  General  Beauregard  had  ordered  ;  and  the  employment  of 
so  large  a  mass  of  the  enemy's  forces  in  the  divergent  operation 
by  Sudley's  Ford  had  so  shortened  the  Federal  line  in  our  front 
that  their  left  (Richardson's  brigade)  only  covered  our  line  as  far 
as  the  left  of  Jones'  position  at  McLean's  Ford,  so  that  the 


AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  33 

enemy  would  have  been  decisively  outflanked  by  Jones,  sup 
ported  by  Early,  who  were  on  Longstreet's  right,  not  to  speak  of 
Ewell,  supported  by  Holmes,  who  were  on  the  right  of  Jones 
and  Early.  The  report  of  the  Federal  brigade  commander, 
Richardson,  shows  his  dread  of  being  out-flanked  by  Jones' 
force,  while  the  latter  held  his  advanced  position  and  stood  await 
ing  the  arrival  of  Ewell  on  his  right,  upon  which  the  general  for 
ward  movement  in  full  line  of  battle  was  to  begin. 

"  In  the  face  of  such  a  movement,  which  should  have  begun 
at  7.30  o'clock  at  latest  (the  orders  to  attack  having  been  sent 
at  5.30)  the  Federal  left,  Richardson,  pressed  in  front  by  Long- 
street  and  out-flanked  by  Jones,  Early,  Ewell  and  Holmes,  must 
have  been  instantly  routed,  exposing  still  more  fatally  the  flank 
of  Davies'  brigade,  which  must  have  dissolved  in  turn  ;  and 
Blencker's,  under  the  full  stress  of  the  flight  of  these  forces  and 
the  advance  of  superior  numbers,  would  have  been  quickly 
stampeded.  The  continuing  result  would  speedily  have  been 
that  Schenck's,  Sherman's  and  Keyes'  forces,  demoralized  by  the 
unexpected  sound  of  conflict  on  their  rear,  and  enveloped, 
must  have  been  overcome  and  scattered  or  captured.  It  is  but 
necessary  to  read  fully  the  immediate  Federal  reports  and  chron 
icles  of  the  day,  or  look  to  the  actual  rout  that  occurred  under  no 
such  pressure  either  of  numbers  or  position,  to  see  at  a  glance 
what  must  have  happened  from  such  a  formidable  and  happily 
related  offensive  movement,  which  even  veteran  troops  could 
hardly  have  successfully  withstood.  ... 

'  Yet,  when  McDowell  cuts  his  own  army  in  two,  isolates  one 
part  from  the  other  by  a  defile,  it  is  [by  General  Johnston]  con 
sidered  '  fortunate '  that  General  Beauregard's  plan  of  attack— by 
which  our  forces  must  have  struck  in  flank  the  exposed  fraction — 
failed  to  go  into  effect ;  and  that  the  enemy  was  meanwhile  per 
mitted  to  execute  unmolested  his  own  movement,  which  General 
Johnston  extols  as  good  strategy— the  undiverted  accomplishment 
of  which  was  fraught  with  such  danger  to  us." 

It  is  not  deemed  necessary,  at  present,  to  say  anything  more  in 
regard  to  General  Johnston's  recently  expressed  opinion  that 
it  was,  "perhaps,"  fortunate  that  Beauregard's  order,  for  Ewell  to 
attack,  miscarried. 


34  GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 

4.  General  Johnston  says  :  "  I  had  been  waiting  with  General 
Beauregard  on  Lookout  Hill  for  evidence  of  General  McDowell's 
design.  The  violence  of  the  firing  on  the  left  indicated  a  battle, 
but  the  large  bodies  of  troops  reported  by  chosen  scouts  to  be 
facing  our  right  kept  me  in  doubt.  But  near  eleven  o'clock 
reports  that  those  troops  were  felling  trees  showed  'hat  they  were 
standing  on  the  defensive ;  and  new  clouds  of  dust  on  the  left 
proved  that  a  large  body  of  Federal  troops  was  arriving  on  the 
field.  It  thus  appeared  that  the  enemy's  great  effort  was  to  be 
against  our  left.  I  expressed  this  to  General  Beauregard,  and  the 
necessity  of  reinforcing  the  brigades  engaged,  and  desired  him  to 
send  immediate  orders  to  Early  and  Holmes,  of  the  second  line, 
to  hasten  to  the  conflict  with  their  brigades.  General  Bonham, 
who  was  near  me,  was  desired  to  send  up  two  regiments  and  a 
battery.  I  then  set  off  at  a  rapid  gallop  to  the  scene  of  action  ; 
General  Beauregard  joined  me  without  a  word." 

From  General  Beauregard's  official  report,  it  has  already  been 
very  clearly  shown  what  he  was  waiting  for,  whilst  General 
Johnston,  as  above  stated  by  himself,  was  waiting  "  for  evidence 
of  General  McDowell's  design."  It  will  presently  be  seen  that 
if  did  not  require  the  "felling  of  trees  ''  by  the  Federals,  in  front 
of  the  Confederate  right  and  centre,  to  convince  General  Beaure 
gard  that  "  the  great  effort  of  the  enemy  was  to  be  against  our 
left." 

But  General  Johnston  would  have  it  believed  that — lie  told 
General  Beauregard  "  the  necessity  for  reinforcing  the  brigades 
engaged  "  ;  he  told  General  Beauregard  to  order  certain  specified 
troops  to  the  left ;  he,  himself,  ordered  other  troops  to  the  same 
point ;  he  then  set  off  at  a  rapid  gallop  to  the  scene  of  action,  and 
General  Beauregard  joined  him  "  without  a  word." 

In  short,  General  Johnston  now  claims  that  when  it  was  re 
ported  the  Federals  were  felling  trees  in  front  of  the  Confederate 
right  and  centre,  he  (Johnston)  suddenly  became  the  sole  active 
director  on  the  Confederate  side,  and  Beauregard  became  a  mere 
automaton. 

The  latter,  in  his  official  report,  states  that  at  10.30  A.  M.  he 
was  informed  the  order  for  Ewell  to  attack  had  miscarried  ;  and 
adds: 


AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  35 

"  In  my  judgment  it  was  now  too  late  for  the  effective  exe 
cution  of  the  contemplated  movement  [of  the  Confederate  right 
and  centre  against  the  left  flank  and  rear  of  the  Federals]  which 
must  have  required  quite  three  hours  for  the  troops  to  get  into 
position  for  the  attack.  Therefore,  it  became  immediately  neces 
sary  to  depend  on  new  combinations  and  other  dispositions  suited 
to  the  now  pressing  exigency.  The  movement  of  the  right  and 
centre,  already  begun  by  Jones  and  Longstreet,  was  at  once 
countermanded,  with  the  sanction  of  General  Johnston,  and  we 
arranged  to  meet  the  enemy  on  the  field  upon  which  he  had 
chosen  to  give  us  battle.  .  .  .  These  orders  having  been 
duly  dispatched  by  staff  officers  at  11.30  A.  M.,  General  Johnston 
and  myself  set  out  for  the  immediate  field  of  action." 

In  farther  illustration  of  actual  occurrences,  on  the  Confed 
erate  right  and  centre,  previous  to  the  time  at  which  these  two 
commanders  left  Lookout  Hill,  the  following  quotations  are 
made  from  General  Beauregard's  recently  published  book,  u  The 
Battle  of  Manassas,"  pages  79  to  88. 

He  says  :  "  Here  it  may  be  mentioned  as  an  incident  signi 
ficant  in  view  of  General  Johnston's  present  architecture  of  nar 
rative,  that  General  Beauregard,  in  order  to  avoid  the  open  road 
as  they  came  within  reach  of  the  enemy's  artillery  fire,  took  the 
wood  paths,  and  for  a  moment  misled  by  their  intricacy  lost  his 
way  and  rode  into  a  pocket  path,  followed  by  General  Johnston  ; 
but,  being  familiar  with  the  direction,  he  struck  a  straight  line 
through  the  woods  to  the  point  he  intended  on  the  Mitchell's 
Ford  road.  Halting  there  for  a  few  moments  to  send  some 
directions  to  General  Longstreet  (he  did  not  go  near  his  position), 
General  Beauregard  pointed  out  to  General  Johnston  the  position 
he  intended  to  occupy  a  short  distance  to  the  left  of  the  road,  to 
which  General  Johnston  thereupon  went.  And  it  was  thus  that 
he  found  himself  at  *  Lookout  Hill,'  in  the  rear  of  Mitchell's 
Ford,  where  General  Beauregard  immediately  joined  him  after 
dispatching  a  message. 

"  General  Beauregard  took  that  position,  however,  for  no 
such  sedentary  purpose  as  '  waiting  for  evidence  of  General 
McDowell's  design,'  but  because  it  was  best  adapted  for  the  obser 
vation  and  following  up  of  the  attack  he  had  ordered,  while  af- 


36  GENERALS   JOHNSTON   AND   BEAUREGARD 

fording  convenient  report  of  the  progress  of  the  enemy's   appa 
rent  offensive  against  his  left. 

"  Here  from  about  8.30  till  10.30,  while  hearing  the  firing  in 
the  direction  of  the  left  near  the  Stone  Bridge,  the  sound  of 
attack  from  our  own  line  of  battle  towards  the  right  was 
awaited.  .  .  . 

"  Neither  General  Johnston  nor  General  Beauregard  knew 
what  force  of  the  enemy  was  in  rear  of  Bull  Run,  nor  what  par 
ticular  forces  of  our  own  were  in  fact  immediately  opposed  to 
them.  They  only  knew  that  an  attack  was  in  progress  against 
our  left  flank,  which  General  Beauregard  had  ordered  to  hold  out 
to  the  last  extremity,  while  the  forces  on  our  right  and  centre 
should  be  executing  the  movement  for  the  counter-attack  and 
seizing  the  enemy's  line  of  communications;  and  they  were  wait 
ing  in  expectation  of  the  sound  of  this  attack,  which  would  have 
turned  the  tables  on  the  Federals,  giving  the  Confederates  their 
ammunition  and  subsistence  trains,  and  effectually  cutting 
off  their  retreat. 

"  But  General  Johnston's  account  is  constructed  so  as  to 
assert  that  our  plan  of  attack,  having  been  frustrated  before 
eight  o'clock  by  the  report  from  chosen  scouts  of  strong  bodies 
of  troops  in  front  of  our  right,  the  forces  were  standing  with 
out  active  orders  from  that  hour  up  to  eleven,  while  he  was  wait 
ing  for  evidence  of  the  enemy's  design,  etc. 

".Now,  the  actual  course  of  events  at  headquarters,  after 
Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard  took  position  in  re\r  of  Mitch 
ell's  Ford,  was  as  follows  :  General  Beauregard  had  sent  the 
signal  officer  (Captain,  afterwards  Brigadier-General  E.  P.  Alex 
ander,  an  accomplished  officer  of  his  army)  to  Wilcoxen's  Hill 
with  couriers  to  observe  and  report  to  him.  Captain  Alexander 
sent  General  Beauregard  two  dispatches  (written,  as  were  all  his 
dispatches  to  headquarters  in  the  field,  not  signaled),  importing 
that  forces  of  the  enemy  were  crossing  the  Run  at  different 
points.  Later  he  came  to  General  Beauregard  in  person,  and 
pointed  out  a  column  of  dust,  which  by  this  time  had  risen  so 
high  as  to  be  visible  above  the  trees  from  our  position.  Gen 
eral  Beauregard  thereupon  dispatched  Captain  W.  H.  Stevens,  of 
the  Engineers,  to  the  extreme  left,  provided  with  couriers  and 


AT   THE   BATTLE   OP    MANASSAS.  37 

with  orders  to  send  him  a  report  of  the  condition  of  affairs 
every  ten  minutes. 

"  Meanwhile,  and  before  any  such  report  came  from  the  left 
(General  Johnston  being  immediately  present  and  a  witness  of 
ear  and  sight),  General  Beauregard  received  from  General  Jones, 
by  Captain  Terry,  of  Texas,  a  dispatch  stating  that  he  had  been 
in  position  all  along  waiting  for  General  Ewell's  force  to  come 
up  on  his  right  and  begin  the  offensive  movement,  as  ordered, 
upon  Centreville,  but  that  Ewell  had  not  come  into  position. 
General  Beauregard  immediately  despatched  Captain  Terry  to 
Ewell  with  an  order  to  hasten  forward.  Soon,  however,  the 
firing  on  the  left  increased  sensibly,  and  General  Johnston  said 
that,  as  matters  seemed  to  be  growing  serious  in  that  quarter, 
he  thought  he  had  better  go  there.  He  proposed  nothing  more 
than  this,  the  usefulness  of  his  immediate  personal  presence  with 
the  troops  engaged,  while  General  Beauregard  remained  in  rear 
of  Mitchell's  Ford  directing  our  own  offensive  movement  which 
he  had  just  reurged  upon  Ewell.  General  Beauregard  thought 
it  a  very  useful  thing  for  General  Johnston  to  do,  but  in  a  few 
moments,  and  before  the  latter  started,  a  dispatch  came  to  General 
Beauregard  from  General  Ewell  himself,  showing  that  he  was  not 
merely  delayed  on  the  way,  but  that,  not  having  received  the 
final  order  to  move  to  the  attack,  he  had  been  at  a  stand  in  his 
original  position  awaiting  it. 

"  This  news  altered  the  whole  aspect  of  the  question  to  Gen 
eral  Beauregard,  who,  from  his  knowledge  of  the  country  to  be 
covered,  thought  it  now  unlikely  that  the  troops  would  be  able  to 
get  into  position  in  time  to  make  their  attack  felt  on  the  right  so 
as  to  co  operate  decisively  with  the  defensive  action  by  such  troops 
as  were  then  on  the  left,  and,  expressing  this  consideration  to 
General  Johnston,  said  that  the  attack  which  had  just  then  been 
reurged  by  order  to  General  Ewell  (to  move  into  position  with 
the  advanced  line  that  was  waiting  for  him),  should  be  abandoned 
altogether,  and  that  all  available  reinforcements  should  be 
hastened  to  the  left  so  as  to  fight  the  battle  in  that  quarter.  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  stating  that  he  could  give  no  positive  advice  on 
the  subject  on  account  of  his  not  understanding  the  country  and 
knowing  but  little  of  the  location  of  the  troops,  expressed  his 


38          GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGABD 

agreement  with  General  Beauregard's  opinion,  though  giving  his 
for  what  it  was  worth.  .  .  . 

"  General  Beauregard  thereupon  ordered  General  Bonham, 
who  was  at  hand,  to  send  to  the  left  two  regiments  and  a  battery 
(Kershaw's  and  Cash's  regiments  with  Keinper's  battery  were  sent), 
and  dispatched  orders  to  Holmes  and  Early  to  move  to  the  same 
quarter,  and  to  Jones  and  Ewell  to  resume  their  former  position. 
But,  considering  it  also  necessary  to  maintain  a  strong  demonstra 
tion  along  our  position  in  front  of  the  Run,  so  as  to  detain  the 
enemy  there,  he  gave,  before  setting  out  for  the  left,  directions 
to  this  effect  to  Bonham,  Longstreet,  Jones  and  Ewell.  After  he 
had  dispatched  these  orders,  General  Johnston  and  he  set  out 
together  for  the  scene  of  the  engagement. 

"  In  his  official  report  of  the  battle,  General  Beauregard  re 
lates  this  change  of  tactics  as  made  with  General  Johnston's 
'  sanction,'  studiously  maintaining  here,  as  elsewhere,  that  reserve 
and  deference  which  military  men  will  understand  as  due  from 
the  junior  to  the  senior  officer  present,  and  toning  statements  down 
to  the  least  self-expression  consistent  with  the  facts.  .  .  . 

"  General  Johnston  in  his  official  report  had  here  said  : 

"  'About  11  o'clock  the  violence  of  the  firing  on  the  left  in 
dicated  a  battle,  and  the  march  of  a  large  body  of  troops  from 
the  enemy's  centre  towards  the  conflict  was  shown  by  clouds  of 
dust.  I  was  thus  convinced  that  his  great  effort  was  to  be  made 
with  his  right.  I  stated  that  conviction  to  General  Beauregard 
and  the  absolute  necessity  of  immediately  strengthening  our 
left  as  much  as  possible.' 

"  The  language  of  this  passage  was  noticed  by  General 
Beauregard  at  the  time  as,  though  being  literally  true  so  far  as 
it  gave  General  Johnston's  opinion  as  expressed  in  concurrence 
with  that  of  General  Beauregard  as  above  related,  yet  bearing 
an  incorrect  suggestion.  But  he  [Beauregard]  was  very  grateful 
for  the  coming  of  the  Shenandoah  force  to  his  assistance,  and  his 
feelings  were  averse  to  the  least  thing  that  might  raise  a  coldness 
between  him  and  General  Johnston.  The  facts  had  been  so 
clearly  stated  in  his  report,  which,  though  he  was  the  junior,  was 
not  questioned  by  his  senior,  whose  duty  it  was  to  do  so  immedi 
ately  after  reading  it  [if  it  needed  correction],  and,  moreover,  the 


AT  THE  BATTLE  OF  MANASSAS.  39 

substantial  facts  themselves  were  so  notorious  that  it  might  have 
seemed  a  pruriency  to  have  raised  under  such  conditions  any  con 
tentious  question.'' 

The  "  incorrect  suggestion,"  contained  in  the  quotation  just 
given  from  General  Johnston's  official  report,  is  the  germ  from 
which  has  now  been  developed  his  claim  that  he  told  General 
Beauregard  to  order  certain  troops  to  reinforce  those  engaged— 
himself  at  once  ordered  additional  forces  to  the  same  point — then 
set  off  for  the  scene  of  action,  and  was  joined  by  Beauregard 
"  without  a  word  !  " 

Further  comment  on  this  branch  of  the  subject  is  not  needed 
here. 

5.  In  his  "  After-thoughts"  General  Johnston  states,  very  truly, 
that,  "  A  large  proportion  of  "  General  Beauregard's  own  army 
"  was  not  engaged  in  the  battle,"  and  adds  : 

"  This  was  a  great  fault  on  my  part.  When  Bee's  and  Jack 
son's  brigades  were  ordered  to  the  vicinity  of  the  Stone  Bridge, 
those  of  Holmes  and  Early  should  have  been  moved  to  the  left 
also,  and  placed  in  the  interval  on  Bonham's  left — if  not  then, 
certainly  at  nine  o'clock,  when  a  Federal  column  was  seen  turn 
ing  our  left ;  and,  when  it  seemed  certain  that  General  McDow 
ell's  great  effort  was  to  be  made  there,  Bonham's,  Longstreet's, 
Jones's  and  Ewell's  brigades,  leaving  a  few  regiments  and  their 
cavalry  to  impose  on  Miles'  division,  should  have  been  hurried 
to  the  left  to  join  in  the  battle." 

In  General  Beauregard's  first  order  for  battle — see  Appendix 
A — Jackson's  brigade  was  assigned  to  the  support  of  Longstreet's 
brigade,  Bee's  brigade  was  assigned  to  the  reserve ;  Elzey's  bri 
gade  fras  to  support  Cocke,  in  the  vicinity  of  Stone  Bridge,  and 
Bartow's  brigade  was  to  support  Bonham  at  Mitchell's  Ford. 
But,  when  it  was  reported,  on  the  morning  of  the  21st,  that  the 
Federals  were  threatening  in  front  of  Stone  Bridge,  Elzey's  bri 
gade  and  a  large  portion  of  Bartow's  had  not  arrived  at  Manassas 
Junction.  Thus,  the  Confederate  left  was  deprived  of  its  reg 
ularly  assigned  supports,  and  the  Federals  were  unexpectedly 
moving  in  force  against  that  part  of  the  line.  The  non-arrival  of 
Elzey's  and  Bartow's  troops  made  it  necessary  to  transfer  Bee's 
and  Jackson's  brigades  to  the  left,  before  7  A.  M. 


40  GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 

At  that  time  General  Beauregard,  with  the  approval  of  Gen 
eral  Johnston,  had  just  ordered  an  important  forward  movement 
to  be  made  by  the  right  and  centre  of  the  Confederate  forces. 
It  is,  therefore,  worse  than  absurd  for  General  Johnston  to  assert 
that  it  was  "  a  great  fault  "  on  his  part,  that  he  did  not  order 
Holmes  and  Early  to  the  left  when  Bee's  and  Jackson's  brigades 
were  ordered  to  the  vicinity  of  Stone  Bridge. 

General  Johnston  further  says:  "We  could  distinctly  hear 
[about  10  A.  M.]  the  sounds  and  see  the  smoke  of  the  fight.  But 
they  indicated  no  hostile  force  that  Evan's  troops  and  those  of 
Bee,  Hampton  and  Jackson,  which  we  could  see  harrying  towards 
the  conflict  in  that  order  were  not  adequate  to  resist." 

There  was  a  ridge  of  high  ground  and  much  woods  between 
the  hill  on  which  General  Johnston  was  then  stationed  and  the 
low  ground  upon  which  the  fighting  was  going  on,  four  or  five 
miles  from  him.  It  was  physically  impossible  for  him  to  have 
seen  "  Evan's  troops  and  those  of  Bee,  Hampton  and  Jackson  " 
"  hurrying  to  the  conflict  in  that  order." 

But,  if  he  had  then  seen  what  he  says  he  did  ;  and  those  troops 
were  "  adequate  to  resist  "  the  "  hostile  force  "  in  their  front ;  it 
would  seem  that  General  Johnston  had  no  good  reason  to  censure 
himself  for  not  having  ordered  "  Holmes  and  Early  "  to  move  to 
the  left,  before  7  A.  M.,  when  they  were  needed  on  the  right  to 
carry  into  effect  the  order  for  the  Confederate  right  and  centre 
to  attack  the  left  flank  arid  rear  of  the  Federals. 

It  is  difficult  to  perceive  why  he  censures  himself  in  this 
matter  except  for  the  double  purpose  of  having  it  now  believed 
that  he  was  in  active  executive  command  during  all  these  opera 
tions,  and  of  throwing  discredit  on  Beauregard's  order  for  the 
Confederate  right  and  centre  to  attack  the  left  flank  and  rear  of 
the  Federals. 

6.  After  stating  that  General  Beauregard  "joined"  him 
"  without  a  word  "  !  General  Johnston  adds  :  "  While  we  were 
riding  forward  General  Beauregard  suggested  to  me  to  assign 
him  to  the  immediate  command  of  the  troops  engaged,  so  that 
my  supervision  of  the  whole  field  might  not  be  interrupted,  to 
which  I  assented." 


AT   THE   BATTLE    OF   MANASSAS.  4 

General  Beauregard,  in  his.  official  report,  says  :  "  As  soon  as 
we  had  thus  rallied  and  disposed  our  forces,  I  urged  General 
Johnston  to  leave  .  the  immediate  conduct  of  the  field  to  me, 
while  he,  repairing  to"  "  the  Lewis  house,  should  urge  reinforce 
ments  forward.  At  first  he  was  unwilling,  but,  reminded  that 
one  of  us  must  do  so,  and  that  properly  it  was  his  place,  he  re 
luctantly,  but  fortunately  complied ;  fortunately,  because  from 
that  position,  by  his  energy  and  sagacity,  his  keen  perception  and 
anticipation  of  my  needs,  he  so  directed  the  reserves  as  to  insure 
the  success  of  the  day." 

General  Johnston,  in  his  official  report,  says  :  "  Order  was 
soon  restored  and  the  battle  re-established.  .  .  .  Then,  in  a 
brief  and  rapid  conference,  General  Beauregard  was  assigned  to 
the  command  of  the  left,  which,  as  the  younger  officer,  he 
claimed,  while  I  returned  to  that  of  the  whole  field.'' 

Whatever  discrepancies  there  may  be  in  the  above  extracts 
from  the  official  reports,  there  is  none  in  regard  to  the  time 
and  place  at  which  the  incident  in  question  occurred.  Each 
of  those  reports  shows  that  General  Johnston  is  certainly  in 
error  when  he  says  :  "  While  we  were  riding  forward  General 
Beauregard  'suggested  to  me  to  assign  him."  The  suggestions 
were  made  after  the  Confederates  had  been  rallied  on  the 
plateau,  and  "  the  battle  re-established." 

There  was  no  occasion,  at  any  time,  during  these  operations, 
for  General  Beauregard  to  urge— suggest — or  request— that  he 
be  assigned  to  the  command  of  u  those  troops '' — because  he 
was  already,  by  authority  of  General  Johnston,  in  actual  com 
mand  of  all  the  forces  of  both  of  the  Confederate  armies  on  that 
field.  But  he  did  insist  that  General  Johnston  should  leave  the 
fighting  line,  and  repair  to  the  Lewis  house  for  the  purpose 
of  urging  reinforcements  forward.  In  this,  General  Beaure 
gard,  in  good  faith,  was  taking  the  best  measures  to  achieve 
success,  under  the  authority  generously  conferred  upon  him  by 
General  Johnston,  when  he  approved  Beauregard's  plans  and 
directed  their  execution  under  Beauregard's  "command."  It 
is  true  that  Johnston  was  reluctant  to  leave  the  plateau,  but 
there  was  no  longer  a  pressing  necessity  for  the  personal  presence 
of  both  of  these  commanders  in  the  fighting  line,  and  General 


42  GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 

Johnston  acted  wisely  in  accepting  Beauregard's  urgent   advice 
in  this  matter. 

7.  In  his  a  After-thoughts,"  General  Johnston  says  :  "  Learn 
ing  that  Bee's  and  Jackson's  brigades  were  still  on  the  right,  I 
again  desired  General  Beauregard  to  transfer  them  to  the  left, 
which  he  did."  "  As  fought,  the  battle  was  made  by  me ; 
Bee's  and  Jackson's  brigades  were  transferred  to  the  left  by  me,  I 
decided  that  the  battle  was  to  be  there,  and  directed  the  meas 
ures  necessary  to  maintain  it ;  a  most  important  one  being  the 
assignment  of  General  Beauregard  to  the  immediate  command 
of  this  left,  which  he  held.  In  like  manner  the  senior  officer  on 
the  right  would  have  commanded  there  if  the  Federal  left  had 
attacked."  <;He  [Beauregard]  commanded  those  troops  under 
me  ;  as  elsewhere  Lieutenant-Generals  commanded  corps  and 
Major-Generals  divisions,  under  me."  "  We  were  compelled  to 
fight  on  the  defensive  .  .  .  on  a  new  and  unsurveyed  fieid  " 
"  selected  by  General  Bee." 

In  General  Johnston's  official  report  there  is  no  intimation 
of  the  implied  censure  contained  in  his  statement  that  he  had  to, 
again,  desire  General  Beauregard  to  transfer  Bee's  and  Jackson's 
brigades  to  the  left.  The  necessity  for  that  transfer  of  these 
two  brigades  was  caused  by  General  Johnston's  mistake  in  regard 
to  the  time  of  arrival  of  a  large  portion  of  his  own  army. 

In  his  official  report  he  says  that  on  the  afternoon  of  the  20th 
he  "  regarded  the  arrival  of  the  remainder  of  the  army  of  the 
Shenandoah  during  the  night  as  certain."  On  this  assurance 
from  General  Johnston,  General  Beauregard,  as  already  stated, 
assigned  Bee's  brigade  to  the  reserve,  Jackson's  brigade  to  sup 
port  Longstreet,  Elzey's  brigade  to  support  Cocke,  and  Bartow's 
brigade  to  support  Bonham.  It  has  already  been  shown  too, 
that,  when  it  was  reported  at  5.  30  A.  M.,  on  the  21st,  that  the 
Federals,  in  strong  force,  were  threatening  the  Confederate  left, 
Elzey's  brigade,  and  a  large  portion  of  Bartow's  had  not  arrived 
at  Manassas  Junction ;  and  the  brigades  of  Cocke  and  Bonham 
were  thus  deprived  of  the  supports  which  had  been  assigned  to 
them.  In  this  state  of  affairs  it  became  necessary  to  transfer 
Bee's  and  Jackson's  brigades  to  the  left. 


AT   THE   BATTLE   OF   MANASSAS.  43 

General  Beauregard,  in  liis  official  report,  says : 

"  About  7  o'clock  A.  M.,  Jackson's  brigade,  with  Imboden's 
and  five  pieces  of  Walton's  battery,  had  been  sent  to  take  up 
position  along  Bull  Run,  to  guard  the  interval  between  Cocke's 
right  and  Bonham's  left,  with  orders  to  support  either  in  case  of 
need.  .  .  .  So  much  of  Bee's  and  Bartow's  brigades,  now 
united,  as  had  arrived,  some  twenty-eight  hundred  muskets,  had 
also  been  sent  forward  to  support  the  position  of  the  Stone 
Bridge." 

But,  even  if  it  were  true  that,  very  early  on  the  morning  of 
the  21st,  General  Johnston  had,  again,  to  desire  General  Beaure 
gard  to  transfer  Bee's  and  Jackson's  brigades  to  the  left,  this 
would  not  prove  that  the  battle,  "as  fought,"  was  made  by  Gen 
eral  Johnston.  At  the  time  of  the  transfer  of  these  two  brigades, 
Beauregard  had  just  ordered  the  Confederate  right  and  centre  to 
attack  the  Federal  left  flank  and  rear,  and  ordered  the  Confed 
erate  left  "  to  maintain  their  position  to  the  last  extremity  ";  and 
General  Johnston  approved  those  orders. 

In  asserting  that  he  "  decided  that  the  battle  was  to  be  "  "  on 
the  Confederate  left,"  General  Johnston  ignores  his  own  state 
ment  that,  "  We  were  compelled  to  fight  on  the  defensive,  .  .  . 
on  a  new  and  unsnrveyed  field"  "  selected  by  General  Bee." 

a  The  field "  loas  "  unsurveyed,"  and  unknown,  to  General 
Johnston  ;  but  General  Beauregard  was  thoroughly  acquainted 
with  all  the  ground  upon  which  these  operations  were  conducted. 
He  certainly  had  something  to  say  in  regard  to  "  the  measures 
necessary  to  maintain  it"  ;  and  it  must  be  admitted  that  General 
McDowell  decided  the  question  as  to  where  the  battle  was  to  be 
fought. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  repeat  here  the  circumstances  connected 
with  the  so-called  u  assignment  of  General  Beauregard  to  the 
immediate  command  of  this  left,  which  he  held."  But,  in  refer 
ence  to  General  Johnston's  assertion  that  General  Beauregard 
"  commanded  those  troops  under  me,  as  elsewhere,  Lieutenant- 
Generals  commanded  corps,  and  Major-Generals  divisions  under 
me  "  ;  it  may  well  be  said  that  this  is  not  in  accord  with  the  official 
records  of  these  events — including  the  letter  of  the  President  of 
the  Confederate  States,  written  at  Manassas  a  few  hours  after  the 


44  GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 

battle  ended— the  letters  of  the  Secretary  of  War  and  General  R. 
E.  Lee,  dated  a  few  days  later — the  joint  congratulatory  address 
issued  by  Generals  Johnston  and  Beauregard  four  days  after  the 
fight— and  the  resolutions  adopted  by  the  Confederate  Congress, 
returning  the  thanks  of  that  body  to  Generals  Johnston  and 
Beauregard  for  the  victory. 

8.  It  will  be  borne  in  mind  that,  in  General  Johnston's  official 
report,  the  only  reference  he  makes  to  the  failure  of  the  Confed 
erate  right  and  centre  to  attack  the  left  flank  and  rear  of  the  Fed 
erals  is  contained  in  the  words :  "  This,  too,  became  impracticable." 
In  that  report  he  makes  no  mention  of  the  miscarriage  of  the 
order  for  General  E  well  to  move  into  action  very  early  on  the 
morning  of  the  21st. 

General  Johnston  now  asserts  : 

'There  could  have  been  no  greater  mistake  on  General 
Ewell's  part  than  making  the  movement  to  Centreville."  "  But 
he  had  no  reason  to  suppose  that  his  commander  [Beauregard] 
desired  him  to  move  to  Centreville  where  there  was  then  no 
enemy."  "  General  E  well  was  not  'instructed  in  the  plan  of 
attack,'  for  he  says  in  his  official  report :  '  I  first  received  orders 
to  hold  myself  in  readiness  to  advance  at  a  moment's  notice.  I 
next  received  a  copy  of  an  order  sent  to  me  by  General  Jones,  in 
which  it  was  stated  that  I  had  been  ordered  to  his  support.'  Three 
other  contradictory  orders,  he  says,  followed." 

"  General  Ewell  does  not  say  that  '  three  other  contradictory 
orders,  were  received  by  him,  as  General  Johnston  ventures  to 
assert,  manifestly  with  the  object  of  fathering  upon  that 
worthy  officer  an  official  criticism  of  General  Beauregard's  orders, 
of  which  he  was  incapable."* 

"  General  Beauregard's  were  successive  orders,  and  no  more 
contradictory  than  are  any  two  or  more  successive  orders  to  suit 
the  changing  circumstances  of  a  battle.  They  were  issued  by  him 
with  General  Johnston  present — they  controlled  the  actions  of 
the  divisions  of  the  army  in  the  crisis  of  the  day."f 

It  has  already  been  shown  that  General  E  well  received  the 
first  order  issued  by  General  Beauregard  early  on  the  morning  of 

*  <k  Battle  of  Manassas."— Beauregard,  p.  107.  f  Page  108. 


AT  THE   BATTLE   OF   MANASSAS.  45 

the  21st,  which  required  all  the  Confederate  forces  to  be  prepared 
to  make  an  immediate  a  offensive  movement"  in  the  direction  of 
Centreville.  General  E well's  Adjutant-General,  in  a  note  written 
on  the  field  that  morning,  stated  that  the  above  order  was  re 
ceived  by  General  Ewell,  and  adds  :  u  It  implies  he  is  to  receive 
another.5' 

There  is  no  justification  for  General  Johnston's  late  assertion 
that  General  Ewell  "  had  no  reason  to  suppose  that ''  General 
Beauregard  "  desired  him  to  move  to  Centreville  where  there  was 
no  enemy."  In  point  of  fact,  Blencker's  brigade,  over  3,000 
strong,  was  at  Centreville,  and  Davies  and  Richardson,  6,000 
strong,  were  in  advance  of  that  place  not  far  from  the  Union 
Mills  road,  on  which  Ewell  was  to  have  moved,  and  initiated  the 
attack  against  the  left  flank  and  rear  of  the  Federals. 

It  is  not  necessary  to  repeat  here  what  has  already  been  said 
in  regard  to  the  eifect  that  would  probably  have  been  produced 
upon  the  brigades  of  Richardson,  Davies  and  Blencker,  then 
upon  those  of  Keyes,  Sherman  and  Schenck,  and  finally  upon 
the  remainder  of  McDowell's  army,  if  the  Confederate  right  and 
centre  had  advanced,  about  7  A.  M.,  and  promptly  attacked  the 
Federal  left  and  rear,  as  they  surely  would  have  done  but  for  the 
miscarriage  of  the  order  sent  to  General  Ewell,  about  5.30  A.  M. 

In  conclusion  it  may  be  stated  that  distinct  traces  of  General 
Johnston's  method  of  conveying  wrong  impressions — by  omis 
sions  and  special  wording — are  found  in  his  official  report.  These 
peculiarities — and  worse — are  far  more  pronounced  in  his  "  Nar 
rative,''  and  they  reach  their  full  development  in  his  Century 
Magazine  article. 

It  has  not  been  considered  necessary  to  point  out,  in  detail, 
all  the  instances  in  which  he  has  resorted  to  such  devices  for  the 
purpose  of  conveying  "  incorrect  suggestions"  in  regard  to  his 
own  and  General  Beauregard's  connection  with  these  opera 
tions  ;  neither  has  it  been  deemed  essential  to  dwell  upon  all 
the  wrong  conclusions  that  might  be  drawn  from  the  state 
ments  he  has  thus  "  contributed ''  to  history.  It  is  believed 
that  enough  has  been  said  to  give  a  clear  idea  of  the  character  of 
his  attempts  to  unduly  exalt  his  own  credit,  and  unfairly  detract 
from  the  well-earned  distinction  of  General  Beaureirard. 


46  GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUREGARD 


APPENDIX  A. 

"  HDQRS.  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  j 
"July  20,  1861.  ) 


"  SPECIAL  ORDERS, 


"The  following  order  is  published  for  the  information  of 
division  and  brigade  commanders : 

"  I.  Brigadier-General  Swell's  brigade,  supported  by  General 
Holmes'  brigade,  will  march  via  Union  Mills  Ford  and  place 
itself  in  position  of  attack  upon  the  enemy.  It  will  be  held  in 
readiness  either  to  support  the  attack  upon  Centreville  or  to 
move  in  the  direction  of  Sangster's  Cross-roads,  according  to 
circumstances. 

"  The  order  to  advance  will  be  given  by  the  Cormnander-in- 
Chief. 

"  II.  Brigadier-General  Jones'  brigade,  supported  by  Colonel 
Early's  brigade,  will  march  via  McLean's  Ford  to  place  itself  in 
position  of  attack  upon  the  enemy  on  or  about  the  Union  Mills 
and  Centreville  road.  It  will  be  held  in  readiness  either  to  sup 
port  the  attack  on  Centreville  or  to  move  in  the  direction  of 
Fairfax  Court-house,  according  to  circumstances,  with  its  right 
flank  towards  the  left  of  Swell's  command,  more  or  less  distant, 
according  to  the  nature  of  the  country. 

"  The  order  to  advance  will  be  given  by  the  Commander-in- 
Chief. 

"III.  Brigadier-General  Longstreet's  brigade,  supported  by 
Brigadier-General  Jackson's  brigade,  will  march  via  McLean's 
Ford  to  place  itself  in  position  of  attack  upon  the  enemy  on  or 
about  the  Union  Mills  and  Centreville  road.  It  will  be  held  in 
readiness  either  to  support  the  attack  on  Centreville  or  to  move 
in  the  direction  of  Fairfax  Court-house,  according  to  circum 
stances,  with  its  right  flank  towards  the  left  of  Jones'  command, 
more  or  less  distant,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  country. 


AT   THE   BATTLE    OF   MANASSAS.  47 

"IV.  Brigadier-General  Bonham's  brigade,  supported  by 
Colonel  Bartow's  brigade,  will  march  via  Mitchell's  Ford  to  the 
attack  of  Centreville,  the  right  wing  to  the  left  of  the  Third  Divi 
sion,  more  or  less  distant,  according  to  the  nature  of  the  country 
and  of  the  attack. 

"  The  order  to  advance  will  be  given  by  the  Commander-in- 
Chief. 

"  V.  Colonel  Cocke's  brigade,  supported  by  Colonel  Elzey's 
brigade,  will  march  via  Stone  Bridge  and  the  fords  on  the  right 
thereof  to  the  attack  of  Centreville,  the  right  wing  to  the  left  of 
the  Fourth  Division,  more  or  less  distant,  according  to  the  nature 
of  the  country  and  of  the  attack. 

"The  order  to  advance  will  be  given  by  the  Commander-in- 
Chief. 

"VI.  Brigadier-General  Bee's  brigade,  supported  by  Colonel 
Wilcox's  brigade,  Colonel  Stewart's  regiment  of  cavalry  and  the 
whole  of  Walton's  battery,  will  form  the  reserve,  and  will  march 
via  Mitchell's  Ford,  to  be  used  according  to  circumstances. 

"  VII.  The  light  batteries  will  be  distributed  as  follows  : 

"1.  To  Brigadier-General  E well's  command,  Captain  Walker's 
six  pieces. 

"  2.  To  Brigadier-General  Jones',  Captain  Alburtis'  and  Stan- 
ard's  batteries,  eight  pieces. 

"  3.  To  Brigadier-General  Longstreet's,  Colonel  Pendleton's 
and  Captain  Imboden's  batteries,  eight  pieces. 

"4.  To  Brigadier- General  Bonham's,  Captain  Kemper's  and 
Shield's  batteries,  eight  pieces. 

"  5.  To  Colonel  Cocke's,  Colonel  Hunton's  and  Captains  La 
tham's  and  Beckham's  batteries,  twelve  pieces. 

"VIII.  Colonel  Eadford,  commanding  cavalry,  will  detail, 
to  report  immediately,  as  follows : 

"  To  Brigadier-General-Ewell,  two  companies  of  cavalry. 
"  To  Brigadier-General  Jones,  two  companies  of  cavalry. 
"  To  Brigadier-General  Longstreet,  two  companies  of  cavalry. 
"  To  Brigadier-General  Bonham,  three  companies  of  cavalry. 
"To  Colonel  Cocke,  the  remaining  companies  of  cavalry,  ex 
cept  those  in  special  service. 


48          GENERALS  JOHNSTON  AND  BEAUBEGABD. 

"IX.  The  Fourth  and  Fifth  Divisions,  after  the  fall  of 
Centreville,  will  advance  to  the  attack  of  Fairfax  Court-house, 
via  the  Braddock  and  turnpike  roads,  to  the  north  of  the  latter. 

"The  First,  Second  and  Third  Divisions  will,  if  necessary, 
support  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Divisions. 

"  X.  In  this  movement  the  First,  Second  and  Third  Divisions 
will  form  the  command  of  Brigadier-General  Holmes ;  the  Fourth 
and  Fifth  Divisions,  that  of  the  second  in  command.  The  re 
serves  will  move  upon  the  plains  between  Mitchell's  Ford  and 
Stone  Bridge,  and,  together  with  the  Fourth  and  Fifth  Divisions, 
will  be  under  the  immediate  direction  of  General  Beauregard. 

"  By  command  of  General  Beauregard. 

"  THOMAS  JORDAN, 

Assistant  Adjutant  General." 


"  HDQKS.  ARMY  OF  THE  POTOMAC,  ) 
July  21,  1861,  4.30  A.  M.       j 


"  SPECIAL  ORDERS,  { 
No. .  f 


"  The  plan  of  attack  given  by  Brigadier-General  Beauregard 
in  the  above  order  is  approved  and  will  be  executed  accordingly. 

"  J.  E.  JOHNSTON, 

General,  C.  S.  Army." 


FIELD   OF   OPERATIONS   IN   VIRGIN 


.^^ 


IA.   JULY    18TH-218T,    1861. 


RETURN      M^l     p 

1 

2 

3 

4 

5 

6 

ALL  BOOKS  MAY  BE  RECALLED  AFTER  7  DAYS 


DUE  AS  STAMPED  BELOW 


act*!  irnn.i_ 

WAR151996 

U.  (X  BERKELEY 

SENT  ON  ILL 

JUL  20  2001 

U.  C.  BERKELEY 

SENtONILL 

AU6  1  3  2001 

U.  C.  BERKELEY 

FORM  NO.  DD  19 


UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA,  BERKELEY 
BERKELEY,  CA  94720 


51045 


, 


THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  CALIFORNIA  LIBRARY 


